Wednesday, 29 October 2025

Late Amendments: Court's Guidance on Amending Pleadings After a Vacated Trial

(A) Introduction 

In Ma Man Chun and Ma Man Kam, the Administratrices of the Estate of Fock Kam Chau, Deceased v. Fu Ka Engineering & Construction Ltd and others, [1] HCPI 272/2020, date of judgment: 27 October 2025, the Court addressed a highly unusual late application to amend pleadings after the trial of the liability issue on the Running List was vacated. The trial was vacated on its first day because the learned trial judge (the “Learned Judge”) found the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim deficient in accommodating the case advanced in their opening submission.

 

Granting leave to amend pleadings at such a late stage is exceptional, especially after a trial date has been fixed. This case serves as a salient reminder of the parties’ duty to assist the Court in case management and provides valuable guidance on the Court’s approach to late amendments as well as the interplay between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings.


(B)  Facts

 

The case arises from a fatal industrial accident on 10 July 2017, where three tunnel workers, including the Deceased, drowned and were overcome by hydrogen sulphide (H₂S) gas in a hand-dug tunnel in Hung Hom (the “Accident”). [2]

 

The Defendants were subsequently prosecuted for breaching statutory duties but were acquitted in 2020. [3] The trial Magistrate found the inflow of underground foul water and H₂S, which caused the Accident, was unknown, unforeseen and not reasonably unforeseeable and that a safe system of work had been provided.

 

In June 2021 (just before the expiration of the 3-year limitation period), the Plaintiffs commenced the subject personal injuries action on behalf of the dependents and the estate of the Deceased. [4]

 

When the case was warned for trial on 16 April 2024, the Learned Judge vacated the trial on the following two main grounds: [5]


(1)  The State of the Evidence: During case management by the Master, the parties consented to adduce various documents including the accident investigation report, statements of opinions and expert reports, most of which were adduced by the criminal proceedings mentioned above. The evidence mentioned above accounted for some 30 box files at the time of the trial, of which 17 to 18 contained the statements given by some 70 individuals involved in the accident investigation. Given the voluminous and complex documentary evidence, the Learned Judge found it difficult to identify the relevant parts for trial.

 

(2) Deficiencies in the Plaintiff’s Pleadings: The Defendants argued that some of the contentions advanced by the Plaintiffs in their opening submission were not accommodated by their pleadings. The Learned Judge agreed with the Defendants’ submission.

 

As such, the Learned Judge made an unless order limiting the time within which the Plaintiffs might take out an application to amend the statement of claim. The parties were directed to seek further case management directions before the case may come on for trial again. [6]

 

Subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed their summons for leave to amend the statement of claim as per draft annexed to the summons. [7] For the purpose of the said application, the Court directed the parties to submit a considered joint statement of the agreed and non-agreed relevant facts with references to the relevant evidence. [8] However, the above exercise did not go well. Therefore, the Court directed at the end of February 2025 that the Plaintiff’s application for leave to amend would be determined based on the materials already before the Court. [9]

 

(C)  Decision

 

The Court’s Approach on Amendments

 

The Court explained that the purpose of the amendments was to ensure the Plaintiffs' pleadings properly reflected the case advanced in their opening submissions, and thus establishing the relevance of the current evidence they intended to rely on. The Learned Judge defined the scope of the amendment as that “to reflect [the plaintiffs’] case as disclosed in their opening submissions”. [10]

 

Although the Learned Judge directed the Plaintiffs to file an affidavit evidencing the basis for their amendments, the Court cautioned that this direction should not be misinterpreted. [11] The Plaintiffs, who verified their pleadings by a statement of truth, relied on evidence from the accident investigation and expert reports. However, at the pleading stage, they were not required to prove their case or to demonstrate that their interpretation of the evidence would ultimately be accepted by the Court. The Defendants remained entitled to dispute these contentions, which would be adjudicated at trial. The direction to file an affidavit did not alter this principle. [12]

 

Consequently, the Court's approach was to determine whether the proposed amendments constituted arguable contentions based on facts or evidence, even if that evidence was disputable in its interpretation. An amendment would only be denied if it was clearly not grounded in the evidence or failed due to a specific and valid challenge from the Defendants. The consideration of whether amendments should be allowed was guided by the general principles for granting amendments and the underlying objectives of Order 1A of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A. [13]

 

Late Application

 

The Court acknowledged that the application for amendment was late. However, it reaffirmed that leave to amend should not be denied on the ground of delay alone, where the purpose is to ensure the real issues in dispute are properly placed before the Court and the parties. [14]

 

The Court further observed that the case required further case management before a new trial could be scheduled. The Learned Judge, in vacating the trial and ordering further case management, must have been aware of the inevitable delay this would cause. In such circumstances, the impact of the amendments on the overall delay was difficult to assess, especially given the issues already taken by the parties’ existing pleadings. As such, the lateness of the application was treated as a relatively neutral factor in the Court's decision. [15]

 

Evidence and Criminal Proceedings

 

The Court addressed the interplay between the evidence from the criminal proceedings and the subject civil proceedings.

 

The parties have agreed to rely on the documents, reports and written opinions arising out of the accident investigation and criminal prosecution as evidence in the trial of the present case without their makers being called to testify. The Plaintiffs have also filed hearsay notice in respect of these as well as other statements and other documents. As such, they would be part of the hearsay evidence to be taken into account in the trial of the subject proceedings. [16]

 

A key dispute arose regarding parts of the expert reports from the criminal proceedings that were redacted. The Defendants argued these redacted parts were “withdrawn” and thus cannot be relied upon. The Plaintiffs replied that the redaction was due to hearsay rules in the criminal proceedings, because the makers of that reports were not called to testify, not because the experts abandoned their opinions.

 

The Court found it premature to rule on the weight or admissibility of those disputed evidence at this stage. The Court highlighted that a full evaluation must wait for the civil trial itself. Further, the Court noted that if the Defendants’ strict interpretation of the evidence were accepted, it could justify striking out the Plaintiffs’ entire claim, which was a stance that the Defendants have not taken. [17]

 

The Proposed Amendments

 

The Court granted leave to the Plaintiff to amend the Statement of Claim subject to the following modifications:

 

Paragraph No.

Court’s Decision and Key Reasons

 

1

Allowed. Amendments were cosmetic and uncontroversial. [18]

 

2(h) to (r)

Allowed. The amendments constituted permissible pleadings of background facts. [19]

 

5(f), (ff)

Allowed, subject to a condition. The Plaintiffs were allowed to plead their theory that driving grouting pipes caused the inflow, but this was conditioned on adding a clause in §8(o) to clarify it is their alleged version of events. [20]

 

8

Amendments largely allowed, with specific revisions: [21]

 

8(o):  Required a new introductory clause: “Insofar as the accident happened in the manner as pleaded in §5(ff) above”.

 

8(t) and (u): Allowed, but the specific descriptors “portable escape-type” and “portable type... with audio-visual” were deleted due to a lack of evidentiary basis.

 

8(v): Disallowed. The plea regarding a "life line" was rejected as its relevance was not readily understandable on the facts.

 

9A

Allowed. The new plea for breach of statutory duty under Regulation 5(4) was permitted, as it arose from substantially the same facts as the existing claim and was not a time-barred new cause of action. [22]

 

11(e)

Allowed. The amendment repeated the particulars of negligence for the purpose of the employer's duty. [23]

 

12A

Allowed. The amendments to plead facts supporting reasonable foreseeability were permitted. The reference to a “60mm foul water pipe” in §12A(d) was corrected to “600mm”. [24]

 

 

Costs

 

It is ordered that the Plaintiffs should pay the Defendants their costs of and occasioned by the application for leave to amend, to be taxed, if not agreed, with certificate for counsel. [25]

(D) Key Takeaways


This case is significant on the following grounds:


1.    Critical Importance of Pleadings: The case underscores that pleadings are foundational. They must accurately and comprehensively define the case to be presented at trial. Failure to do so can lead to serious consequences, including the vacating of a trial, significant costs, and substantial delays.

 

2.    The Permissibility of Late Amendments: The Court affirmed that while delay is a relevant factor, it is not an absolute bar to amendments. Leave to amend at a late stage may be granted to ensure the real issues in dispute are properly placed before the Court and the parties. However, the scope of such amendments is limited to properly reflecting the case the party has already indicated it intends to advance.

3.    Interplay with Criminal Proceedings: This case clarifies that findings from criminal proceedings are not binding in a subsequent civil case arising from the same facts. The parties agreed to admit the documents from the criminal proceedings as hearsay evidence in the civil proceedings, without calling the makers of those documents. The civil trial judge will independently evaluate the weight and credibility of such evidence as the burden of proof in civil proceedings differs from that in the criminal proceedings.




[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=173789
[2]Ma Man Chun and Ma Man Kam, the Administratrices of the Estate of Fock Kam Chau, Deceased v. Fu Ka Engineering & Construction Ltd and others§2, 4
[3]  Ibid§5
[4]  Ibid§7
[5] Ibid§10-15
[6] Ibid§16
[7] Ibid§17

[8] Ibid§19
[9] Ibid§20
[10] Ibid§33
[11] Ibid§34
[12] Ibid§35
[13] Ibid§36, §38
[14] Ibid§54
[15] Ibid§55
[16] Ibid§56
[17] Ibid§60
[18] Ibid§61
[19] Ibid§80
[20] Ibid§85
[21] Ibid§101
[22] Ibid§95
[23] Ibid§96
[24] Ibid§101
[25] Ibid§102

Saturday, 25 October 2025

Over a Decade in Court: How Ambiguous Contract Led to Costly Litigation

(A) Introduction

Dracco Netherlands B. V. v. Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, HCA 304/2014, date of judgment: 16 October 2025, [1] concerns a licensing dispute between Dracco Netherlands B. V. (“Dracco”), the licensor, and Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG (“Simba”). 

The dispute arose from a Licensing Agreement for the manufacture and distribution of “Filly” toys from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013 in the Pan-Europe market. [2] The relationship between Dracco and Simba deteriorated when conflicts emerged over the calculation of royalties. This led Dracco to serve a notice on 26 September 2013, terminating the Licensing Agreement with effect from 31 December 2013. [3] Subsequently, each party accused the other of material breach and purported to terminate the Licensing Agreement. [4] 

This case is a classic example of post-contractual disputes in licensing agreements. Most importantly, it serves as a stark caution about procedural delay and the parties’ responsibility in case management. This case has been before the court for over a decade. The Court highlighted that such protracted litigation is unacceptable. As a safeguard against similar situations arising in the future, the Court suggested that in all commercial cases, a procedural timetable should be established with the court at the earliest opportunity and subject to regular reviews before a master or judge to ensure compliance with the timetable. [5]

(B) Facts

Under a Licensing Agreement, Dracco licensed Simba to manufacture and distribute “Filly” toys from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013 in the Pan-Europe market. The Licensing Agreement provided for the payment of royalties by Simba to Dracco. A key feature of the Licensing Agreement was a tiered royalty structure with three product categories (A, B and C), where Category B attracted a higher rate than Category A. [6] The definitions of these categories, particularly regarding figurines and playsets, were the major issues in dispute.

The parties’ relationship soured over disputes regarding royalty calculations. On 26 September 2013, Dracco served a notice to terminate the Licensing Agreement with effect from 31 December 2013. Subsequently, a dispute over a €75,000 deduction led Dracco to purport to terminate the Licensing Agreement extraordinarily on 15 January 2014. [7] Simba claimed Dracco's actions constituted a repudiatory breach. Following termination, Dracco notified Simba's customers that Simba no longer had the right to sell the Filly products, which Simba alleged disrupted its sales.

The parties framed their dispute through the following Agreed List of Issues: [8]

Issue No.

Issue


1

Has there been a mis-categorisation of Filly products by Simba in the calculation of royalties?


2

How was the TV promotion discount in the Licensing Agreement to be applied?


3

Was there a discrepancy between figurines supplied and playsets sold?


4

Did Simba adopt incorrect royalty rates?


5

Has Simba failed to pay licence fees for the 1st quarter of 2014?


6

Was there a fixed royalty rate for Category C products or was the royalty rate based on a ratio between the Suggested Retail Price (SRP) and the unit rate at which the products were sold?


7

Were incorrect price discounts and deductions applied in calculating licence fees?


8

Did Simba sell to its Hungarian customer at prices greater than what it stated in its royalty reports?


9

Where returned goods are re-sold, was Simba required to pay royalty twice for such goods?


10

Has there been a failure to provide a royalty report for the 1st quarter of 2014?


11

Was the Licensing Agreement validly terminated by one or other party or did the Licensing Agreement expire by the effluxion of time?


12

Was Simba entitled to a sell-off period under Clause 1(k) and (if so) did Simba sell in excess of its 10% entitlement during the sell-off period?


13

Did Simba sell unauthorised Filly products in the Russian or any other market after the expiry of the Licensing Agreement causing damage to the image, reputation and goodwill of the Filly brand and (if so) what was the damage caused?


14

Did Simba breach the Licensing Agreement and cause damage to the image, reputation and goodwill of the Filly brand by:

(a) manufacturing, selling and using the Filly Products without the prior written approval of the Plaintiff during the term of the Licensing Agreement, or whether such activity was done by Simba Noris and Simba Dickie pursuant to separate oral agreements with Dracco,

(b) failing to return drafts, models, samples etc created in the process of arranging and designing the Filly products upon Dracco’s request, and


(c) wrongly asserting copyright in the designs of Filly products.


15

Should there be an audit or account?


16

Did Dracco breach an implied quiet enjoyment term under the Licensing Agreement by disturbing Simba’s ability to sell Filly products and thereby leading to lower revenue for Simba?




(C) Decision

The Court’s rulings on the 16 agreed issues are summarized as follows:

Issue No.

Ruling


1

The Court held that for a product to be in the higher-royalty Category B, the figurine must have been supplied by Dracco. Figurines developed by Simba were correctly classified under Category A. [9]


2

The Court held that the 3% TV promotion discount was country-specific. It rejected Simba’s argument that a promotion in one country applied to sales across Pan-Europe. In the absence of clear expression, the Court found it unreasonable to assume a promotion in a German-speaking market would entitle Simba to a discount on sales in non-German markets. [10]


3

The Court found a significant, unexplained gap between the quantity of figurines supplied by Dracco and playsets sold by Simba, warranting further investigations. [11]


4

The Court found that the parties had not reached any agreement to re-categorize certain products. As no binding agreement was signed, Simba was correct to issue debit notes adjusting the higher royalties paid on the relevant products downwards to the applicable Category A or Category C levels. [12]


5

The Court rejected Dracco’s claim for the licence fees because of a lack of evidence supporting the calculation. [13]


6

The Court found that there was no agreement to charge royalties for Category C products in line with the Suggested Retail Price (“SRP”) for the same [14] and that there is no evidence showing a change in the SRP of Category C products at any material time. [15]


7

The Court held that pursuant to Clauses 1(f) [16] and 10(a) [17] of the Licensing Agreement, royalty is payable based on the invoiced amount of products sold. [18] The Court also found that depending on the market, Simba was sometimes able to sell goods at list price, while on other occasions Simba had to sell goods at less than the list price. Therefore, Simba was not improperly deducting discounts from the royalty base. [19]


8

The Court rejected Dracco's claim of under-declaration based on two Hungarian invoices on the following grounds: (1) this argument was raised too late (in closing submissions); and (2) there was no cross-examination of Simba's witnesses in respect of the two Hungarian invoices. [20]

9

The Court found that Clause 11(f) of the Licensing Agreement does not deal with the situation where the returned product is resold to another customer. Further, it is common sense that Simba should not have to pay royalty twice on the same product. [21]


10

Same as Issue 5. [22]


11

The Court held that neither party validly terminated the Licensing Agreement, whether extraordinarily under Clause 14 [23] or at common law for repudiatory breach. [24] Dracco's termination over the €75,000 was unjustified as Simba was taking steps to correct the error. Simba's subsequent acceptance of repudiation was equivocal. As such, the Licensing Agreement expired by effluxion of time, at the end of the 90-day sell-off period on 31 March 2014. [25]


12

The Court accepted Simba’s evidence that it arranged for the destruction of excess inventory in February 2014. [26] It also found that there is no compelling evidence that, during the sell-off period, Simba sold more than its 10% entitlement. [27]


13

The Court rejected Dracco's claim that Simba sold unauthorized products in Russia. [28] It found that Super Toys and Saks Toys were independent customers, not Simba's agents, and Simba had no control over their subsequent sales. [29]


14

(a)   Withdrawn by Dracco. [30]


(b) The Court found no compelling evidence that any items (such as design drawings) wrongly withheld by Simba caused Dracco loss or damage. [31]


(c) The Court held that Simba’s dispute and subsequent action against Universal Trends did not constitute a wrongful assertion of intellectual property rights over Dracco’s designs. [32]


15

The Court declined to order an audit under Clause 11(d) of the Licensing Agreement, [33] upholding prior interlocutory decisions on the following grounds:

(1) The audit right in Clause 11(d) was intrinsically linked to the ongoing operation of the Licensing Agreement. Its purpose was to ascertain the amount of licence fees payable while the contract was active. Upon termination, any claim for unpaid royalties transformed into a simple claim for debt or damages. 

(2) Even if the audit clause did survive, the Court found that the "balance of convenience" was against granting an interlocutory injunction to force an audit. Dracco failed to demonstrate an urgent need for an audit or that it would suffer "irreparable damage" if the audit was not conducted immediately at the interlocutory stage. The Court also found that the normal process of discovery of documents (The Rules of the High Court Order 24) in the ongoing lawsuit would be just as comprehensive as a contractual audit. To order an audit at an interim stage would effectively be giving Dracco a significant part of the final relief it sought in the action before trial. Courts are generally reluctant to do this.

However, the Court ordered Simba to account to Dracco in respect of (1) deductions claimed in relation to TV promotions (Issue 2); and (2) the discrepancy between figurines supplied and playsets sold (Issue 3). [34]


16

The Court dismissed Simba's counterclaims for lost profits, finding a lack of compelling evidence linking the alleged losses to Dracco's market communications. [35]



In light of the above, the Court directed further hearings to address consequential matters arising from Issues 2, 3, 5 and 10 as well as other outstanding matters (including costs). The Court viewed this case as suitable for mediation, which could have brought a speedy resolution of the parties’ differences and noted that Practice Direction 31 is relevant to the incidence and assessment of costs in this case. [36] 

(D) Key Takeaways

This case is significant on the following grounds:

1. Draft Contracts with Precision: The dispute arose from ambiguous definitions of product Categories A and B, which commanded different royalty rates. As a result, the parties' relationship deteriorated. This underscores the importance of drafting contracts with clear and unambiguous definitions, particularly for key financial terms like product categories and royalty calculations.

2. Act Promptly on Contractual Rights: The Court's refusal to order a formal audit under Clause 11(d) of the Licensing Agreement was influenced by prior rulings and the passage of time. This highlights that a party's delay in exercising a time-sensitive contractual right (for example, conducting an audit) can jeopardize or even extinguish that remedy. 

3. Termination must be Justified and Unequivocal: The Court held that neither party's termination was valid. This reinforces that a party must have a clear and valid basis to terminate a contract for breach. Further, any acceptance of a repudiatory breach must be communicated in a clear and unequivocal manner to be effective. 

4. Consider Mediation Early: The Court viewed that this case was suitable for mediation. Notably, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 31, in exercising its discretion on costs, the Court takes into account all relevant circumstances. [37] These would include any unreasonable failure of a party to engage in mediation where this can be established by admissible materials.  This case serves as a warning to legal representatives that they must advise their clients of the possibility of the Court making an adverse costs order where a party unreasonably fails to engage in mediation. 

5. Avoid Prolonged Litigation through Active Case Management: The Court explicitly stated that “this action has been before the court for over a decade”, which the Court viewed that it was "not acceptable". The parties should be proactive in case management. For all future commercial cases, a strict procedural timetable should be established with the court at an early stage and subject to regular reviews before a master or judge to ensure compliance with the timetable. 



[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/word/vetted/other/en/2014/HCA000304F_2014.docx
[2] Dracco Netherlands B. V. v. Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, HCA 304/2014, date of judgment: 16 October 2025, §1
[3]  Ibid§34
[4]  Ibid§1
[5] Ibid§87
[6] Ibid§3
[7] Ibid§38
[8] Ibid§2
[9] Ibid§6-7
[10] Ibid§10
[11] Ibid§13
[12] Ibid§14
[13] Ibid§15
[14] Ibid§20
[15] Ibid§22
[16] royalties are payable as a percentage of: all sales turnover, which the Licensee generates for Products sold, before any deduction whatsoever (Including, but not limited to, any discounts, commission, bonus arrangements, administration/ distribution fees etc, return products or any other costs relating to the Licensee sales and distribution of the Products).
[17] In consideration of the License granted hereunder, the Licensee shall pay the License Fee as defined under Sec.1.f) of this Agreement to the Licensor. The net income Invoiced shall be the price at which the Products are sold to wholesale and retail traders, less the statutory value-added tax. No further deductions (including, but not limited to, any discounts, commission, bonus arrangements, administration/ distribution fees etc, return products or any other costs relating to the Licensee sales and distribution of the Products) shall be permissible. The License Fee calculated on the basis of this computation shall be payable plus the statutory value-added tax, If VAT is applicable. 
[18] Dracco Netherlands B. V. v. Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, HCA 304/2014, date of judgment: 16 October 2025, §25
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid§28-29
[21] Ibid§30
[22] Ibid§31
[23]  a) Both Parties agree that the Licensor has the right to terminate this Agreement extraordinarily for a good cause with immediate effect, if at least one of the following alternative requirements is fulfilled:
....
-- The Licensee materially breaches any other term or obligation as outlined in this Agreement or as can reasonably be expected to be a material part of the obligations of the Licensee.
Full minimum guarantee shall be payable upon such termination. The right to claim compensation for further losses Is reserved in favour of the Licensor.
b) The extraordinary termination of this Agreement shall be effective retroactively, taking effect from the time when the good cause first occurred. The termination shall not affect any other claims, e.g. tb damages or recourse. In addition to all other claims, In the event of termination of the Agreement, immediate payment of the entire remuneration agreed between the Parties, wherever such remuneration has been agreed, Is due.
c) In the event of termination or upon expiry of the Agreement, all rights transferred to the Licensee hereunder shall revert to the Licensor automatically and without the need for any further declarations and deadlines.
[24] Dracco Netherlands B. V. v. Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, HCA 304/2014, date of judgment: 16 October 2025, §46
[25] Ibid.
[26] Dracco Netherlands B. V. v. Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, HCA 304/2014, date of judgment: 16 October 2025, §51
[27] Ibid, §52 
[28] Ibid, §56
[29] Ibid, §58
[30] Ibid, §59
[31] Ibid, §66
[32] Ibid, §73
[33] The Licensor or Licensor's Agent shall be entitled at any time to have the Licensee's business records and documents relating to the Products inspected by an auditor who Is under an obligation of secrecy. The cost of said inspection shall be borne by the Licensee if an accounting error to the Licensor's disadvantage Is discovered, pursuant to which the amount actually due to Licensor exceed the amount actually paid to licensor by more than 5% of this latter amount. Moreover Licensor may at all times request an Inventory report showing current inventory of Products.
[34] Dracco Netherlands B. V. v. Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, HCA 304/2014, date of judgment: 16 October 2025, §79
[35] Ibid, §85
[36] Ibid, §86
[37] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/pd/pdcontent.jsp?pdn=PD31.htm&lang=EN