(A) Introduction
Wong Kwok Ki Stephen as the joint and several trustee of the property of Kwong Kwok Chi Patrick and another v. Lee Lin and another (DCCJ 6382/2020, date of reasons for decision: 10 February 2026) [1] is the first case in 2026 where a wasted costs order was made against a solicitor for conduct during a Case Management Conference (“CMC”).
The Plaintiffs appealed a timetabling decision made by a Master on the ground that the decision had been procured by the 1st Defendant's solicitor knowingly misleading the Master about Counsel’s availability for trial. The Court described this matter as “an unusual appeal against the timetabling decision of a Master made in a CMC which was said to have been obtained by a legal representative knowingly misleading the Master”.
Ultimately, the Plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissed on the ground that the timetabling decisions in a CMC are a particular aspect of case management that should remain firmly in the hands of the listing officer of the District Court and the specific judicial officers entrusted with that task and should not be interfered by a judge in chambers through an appeal under Order 58. That said, the Court found that that solicitor had clearly misled the Master. As such, the Court made a wasted costs order against that solicitor and his firm as well as referred the matter to the Law Society of Hong Kong for consideration.
This case marks a significant development in the Hong Kong Court's approach to case management and the professional conduct of legal representatives. It serves as a stark reminder to the legal profession that they owe a duty to the Court, particularly in the context of case management conferences where judicial officers rely heavily on accurate information from solicitors to make efficient use of court resources. It also clarifies that the proper way to challenge or vary case management timetables is by application under Order 25, rule 3, not by appeal under Order 58.
(B) Facts
The underlying action was commenced in 2020 by the Trustees in Bankruptcy of Kwong Kwok Chi Patrick (“Ps”) against the bankrupt and his ex-wife Lee Lin (“D1”). [2]
By December 2025, the case was ready to be set down for trial. In the CMC held before a Master (the “Master”) on 9 December 2025, the consultant solicitor (the “Solicitor”) of a firm acting for the 1st Defendant (the “D1’s firm”), was asked directly about the earliest available dates for the D1's intended trial counsel (the “Counsel”). The Solicitor repeatedly informed the Master that the Counsel’s earliest available date for an 8-day trial was March 2027. Relying on this representation, the Master fixed the trial to commence on 2 March 2027 with 3, 4, 5, 8 to 11 March 2027 reserved, and with the Pre-trial Review be held on 20 January 2027 (the “CMC Order”). [3]
Three days later, on 12 December 2025, Ps' solicitors wrote to the D1’s firm and copied to the Counsel expressing doubts about this representation. [4] On 15 December 2025, the Counsel wrote to confirm that her available dates for an 8-day trial in 2026 had been provided to the D1’s firm before the CMC. These dates included periods in April, May and June 2026. [5]
Despite this, the D1’s firm, while knowing full well that the Counsel had informed the Ps’ solicitors of her availability for trial in 2026, retorted that Ps’ solicitor “agreed” to the dates in the CMC, that she had made no protest therein, and that they were under no duty to explain their conduct in the CMC. The D1’s firm then indicated that “merely to save time and costs”, they were agreeable to refixing the trial dates by consent to fall within either 20-30 April, 18-29 May or 1 to 12 June 2026 (without stating that they were the Counsel’s available dates in 2026) but on the condition that the “PTR be fixed … within the available dates of the legal team of the 1st Defendant”, but without specifying what those “available dates” would be. [6]
By letter dated 17 December 2025 to D1’s firm, Ps’ solicitors replied that the trial dates could not be so refixed merely by parties’ consent and insisted on D1’s firm providing the clarifications sought as to the actual available dates of the Counsel’s diaries. [7]
By letter dated 18 December 2025, the D1’s firm refused again, citing confidentiality concerning the communications between them and the Counsel as a reason and that they were “under no duty” to provide such clarification. [8]
On 19 December 2025, Ps issued a Notice of Appeal and asked that the CMC Order be set aside and that the trial dates be fixed by a Master in consultation with counsel’s diaries. [9]
In the Solicitor’s affidavit filed in opposition to the appeal (the “Affidavit”), he exhibited the Counsel’s email dated 3 December 2025, which clearly listed her 2026 availability. He admitted telling the Master the earliest date was March 2027, but “strenuously denied” misleading the Court. He argued that his representation was based on his professional judgment of what was “realistic”, considering factors like trial preparation, the complexity of the case and the need to extend the legal aid certificate. [10]
(C) Decision
Solicitor Found to Have Misled the Master
The Court held that the Solicitor misled the Master on 9 December 2025 on the following grounds:
(1) The Master asked more than once a simple and direct factual question, which was what the earliest available dates in the Counsel’s diaries for an 8-day trial were. There could be no misunderstanding of what the Master was asking. [11] The answers given by the Solicitor to the Master more than once were plainly and knowingly incorrect. [12]
(2) The Court rejected the Solicitor’s explanations in the Affidavit. The Solicitor argued that in his view and judgment, the “realistic” dates for the trial to take place would be in March 2027, and that he was therefore justified or entitled or not wrong to deceive or mislead the Master by a falsehood into deciding on a result he thought was correct. The Court found that such conduct undermined the proper administration of justice and had no place in civil litigation. [13]
(3) The only proper conduct for the Solicitor was to answer the Master with the actual available dates of the Counsel, truthfully as the Counsel had informed him, and then make his submissions on behalf of D1 on the other matters he thought would justify the trial to take place at a later date, and let the Master decide. [14]
(4) The Solicitor’s false representations concerning the Counsel’s earliest available dates for trial led to the fixing of trial dates as late as March 2027. [15]
The Dismissal of the Ps’ Appeal
Notwithstanding the above finding, the Court dismissed Ps’ appeal, but without prejudice to them applying before a Master under Order 25, rule 3 to vary the timetable on the following grounds:
(1) The timetabling decision in a CMC is a matter of case management that should remain firmly in the hands of the listing officer of the District Court and the specific judicial officers entrusted with that task. Such decisions should not be interfered with by a judge in chambers through an appeal under Order 58. [16]
(2) The proper procedure for varying milestone dates is to first apply to the Master (or the trial judge) under Order 25, rule 3, which requires showing “exceptional circumstances”. [17]
(3) The Court refused to treat this appeal as an application under Order 25, rule 3 to vary the trial dates. The nature of such application was different from that of an appeal against the CMC Order. Further, the Court was not equipped to know the available coram and court dates, nor was its function to fix and vary the timetable to new dates. An application under Order 25, rule 3 in the circumstances of this case should have been made to the Master. [18]
Costs Order
Although Ps’ appeal was dismissed, the Court held that costs should not follow the event. In light of the Court’s finding on the Solicitor’s conduct, the responses of the D1’s firm and Ps’ plight, the just and appropriate costs order for this appeal between Ps and D1 was no order as to costs. [19]
Further, the Court made two wasted costs orders against the Solicitor and D1’s firm as well as referred the matter to the Law Society of Hong Kong for consideration. [20]
(D) Key Takeaways
This case is significant on the following grounds:
(1) First wasted costs order in 2026 for CMC misconduct: This case is the first in 2026 where a wasted costs order was imposed specifically for misconduct in a CMC. It shows the Court’s robust approach to upholding professional standards. Most importantly, it serves as a timely reminder that the Court’s ability to function efficiently depends on the accuracy of the information provided by legal representatives. What might be perceived as a minor administrative step, such as the fixing of pre-trial review and trial dates, can have a significant impact on the progress of a case and the administration of justice as a whole.
(2) Rejection of the “Realistic Date” Defence: The Court rejected the Solicitor’s attempt to justify a false statement by claiming that it was based on his “realistic” view of the case. A solicitor’s opinion on case readiness cannot override the duty to provide truthful information to the Court. When answering the Master’s question on the Counsel’s available dates, solicitors should state what the Counsel had actually informed them and then make submissions on why a later trial might be justified. It is wholly unacceptable to substitute a fact with one’s own opinion of what is “realistic”. Such conduct misleads the Court and may result in wasted costs orders and professional disciplinary referral.
(3) Proper Procedure for Challenging or Varying a Milestone Date: This case clarifies the correct procedure for challenging case management timetables. An appeal to a judge is generally the wrong route. Parties must first apply to the Master to vary a “milestone date” (for example, a trial date) under Order 25, rule 3 and must demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to justify the variation.
[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=177181
[2] Wong Kwok Ki Stephen as the joint and several trustee of the property of Kwong Kwok Chi Patrick and another v. Lee Lin and another (DCCJ 6382/2020, date of reasons for decision: 10 February 2026) , §3
[3] Ibid, §4-§5
[4] Ibid, §7
[5] Ibid, §8
[6] Ibid, §9
[7] Ibid, §10
[8] Ibid, §11
[9] Ibid, §12
[10] Ibid, §15-§17
[11] Ibid, §19
[12] Ibid, §16
[13] Ibid, §20
[14] Ibid, §21
[15] Ibid, §22
[16] Ibid, §30-§31
[17] Ibid, §34-§35
[18] Ibid, §37
[19] Ibid, §40
[20] Ibid, §41, §42 and §44
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