Mapping the Boundaries: District Court Clarifies Jurisdiction on Pre-Action Discovery & Norwich Pharmacal Relief

(A) Introduction

In Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, DCMP 787/2025, date of judgment: 31 July 2025,[1] the District Court clarified its jurisdictional boundaries regarding pre-action discovery and Norwich Pharmacal orders. 

This landmark decision provides critical guidance on the statutory and inherent powers available to the District Court in such applications.

(B) Facts

On 5 June 2022, the Plaintiff sustained neck/shoulder injuries while onboard a flight operated by the Defendant. At the material times, a piece of luggage fell from an overhead compartment onto her head while she sat in seat 74C. She alleged that a female passenger (the “Female Passenger”) dislodged the bag while stowing it.  As such, she viewed that the accident was caused by the Female Passenger’s negligence and intended to commence proceedings against the Female Passenger for damages. 

By an Originating Summons dated 6 February 2025 (the “OS”), the Plaintiff applied for a pre-action discovery/Norwich Pharmacal order against the Defendant, pursuant to section 47A And 47B of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 (the “DCO”), Order 24, rule 7A of the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H and the inherent jurisdiction of the District Court. The relief sought to compel the Defendant to disclose the Female Passenger’s full name, passport/ID number, and address to facilitate a negligence claim against her.

(C) Procedural History

At the first hearing of the Plaintiff’s application, Deputy District Judge Ebony Ling raised queries with the Plaintiff’s legal representatives, concerning, inter alia, the applicability of sections 47A and 47B of the DCO to the facts of the present case.

Subsequently, at the adjourned hearing, after reviewing the Plaintiff’s skeleton submission, the Court ordered further submissions addressing, inter alia, the existence of the District Court’s alleged inherent jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal orders.

The Defendant maintained a neutral stance throughout and was excused from attendance. 

(D) Decision

Statutory Provisions

Section 47A of the DCO

The Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s application under Section 47A of the DCO on the following grounds:

1. Section 47A(1) clearly states that the powers conferred by the section apply only where the discovery is sought against a person who is likely to be a party to the subsequent proceedings. The Defendant was not likely to be a party to the intended subsequent personal injury proceedings. 

2. Section 47A relates and refers only to the discovery of “documents”. The Plaintiff only sought “personal information” of an individual, not “document” within the Defendant’s possession. 

3. The documents sought under Section 47A(1) must be directly relevant to an issue arising out of the claim. The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the disclosures sought met this threshold. 

Section 47B of the DCO

The Court held that the Plaintiff’s application was outside the scope of Section 47B of the DCO on the following grounds: 

1. Section 47B of the DCO provides the District Court with power to order disclosure of “documents” and/or inspection of “property” only. The Plaintiff sought only “information” from the Defendant. As such, the disclosures sought by the Plaintiff were outside the scope of Section 47B of the DCO. 

2. A pre-requisite requirement for any application brought under Section 47B is that the applicant must be a party to proceedings that have already been commenced and where a claim is extant. As the Plaintiff was not a party to existing proceedings in which a claim has been made, she was unable to rely on Section 47B of the DCO to obtain the relief that she sought. 

The District Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction 

The Court held that the District Court did not possess inherent jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal orders.

The Court highlighted the difference between the Court of First Instance and the District Court. The Court of First Instance is a superior court of record, with “presumed jurisdiction” under Sections 3 and 12 of the High Court Ordinance. In contrast, the District Court is an inferior court of record with its jurisdiction and powers limited by Section 3 of the DCO. Notwithstanding such statutory restriction on the jurisdiction and powers, inferior courts may, in the absence of an express statutory power, have “implied” powers to grant certain orders. 

Express Statutory Power

Section 52 of the DCO

A Norwich Pharmacal order is a disclosure order. It is procedural in its nature, compelling a third party to disclose documents or information which will assist an applicant in the formulation or conduct of their case against a wrongdoer, normally in entirely separate proceedings. As such, the Court viewed that a Norwich Pharmacal order as an injunction, does not fall within the meaning or ambit of section 52 of the DCO. 

Section 48 of the DCO

Section 48 (and indeed Section 52) is not a jurisdiction-conferring provision and only provides ancillary jurisdiction to the District Court to make orders once primary jurisdiction to hear a particular case has been established.

The Plaintiff application was made in stand-alone DCMP proceedings. It did not fall into any of the primary jurisdiction conferring provisions in Sections 32, 33, 35 and 37 of the DCO. As such, the District Court’s primary jurisdiction was not established or engaged. 

Implied Power

The Court found that the District Court possesses an implied power to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief. Such power arises by way of implication from the jurisdiction expressly conferred on the District Court by Sections 32, 33, 35 and 37 of the DCO. 

Discretionary Relief Denied

Despite confirming jurisdiction, the Court held that its discretion should not be exercised and dismissed the Plaintiff’s application on the following grounds:

1. By a letter dated 14 June 2022, the Plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the Defendant seeking the disclosure of personal particulars of two passengers and a flight attendant in the employ of the Defendant.  However, in the OS, the Plaintiff cited only “a female passenger”. 

2. Given the above inconsistencies, the Court failed to see how the Defendant would be able to identify which of the female passengers the order refers and hence could not comply with any order in terms which may be made by the Court.  

(D) Key Takeaways

This decision clarifies the jurisdictional limits of the District Court, confirming that while it lacks inherent jurisdiction, it may exercise implied powers where necessary to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief. 

Further, this decision provides useful guidelines for pre-action discovery. In particular, relief is confined to directly relevant documents or property (excluding mere “information”), with Section 47A requiring discovery against a likely future party to subsequent litigation and Section 47B requiring existing proceedings. 

Applicants seeking pre-action discovery and Norwich Pharmacal orders must precisely identify the type of the requested documents and define the scope of the requested documents, as vagueness or inconsistencies may jeopardize the application. Where such applications fail, the Courts typically order the applicant to bear the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis. This underscores the burden of precision in pre-action discovery applications.

Hong Kong Court Upholds the Finality of Delisting Decision

(A) Introduction
 
In China Ocean Industry Group Ltd v. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd,[1] HCAL 616/2023, date of judgment: 25 July 2025, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance (the “Court”) dismissed the Applicant’s (the “Company”) application for leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the decision made by the Listing Division (the “LD”) and the Listing Review Committee (the “LRC”) concerning its delisting.
 
This decision provides important guidance on the scope of judicial review and the finality of delisting decisions under Rule 2B.16 of the Listing Rules.
 
(B) Facts
 
The Company, incorporated in Bermuda with limited liability, was listed on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange on 6 April 1995.[2]
 
Trading in the Company’s shares was suspended on 1 April 2021 due to delayed publication of its annual results for the year ended 31 December 2020.[3] The deadline for the Company to resume trading in its shares was 30 September 2022, failing which it could be delisted under Rule 6.01A of the Listing Rules. [4]
 
On 19 December 2022, the LD recommended that the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Exchange”) delist the Company.[5] On 23 December 2022, the Listing Committee (the “LC”) decided to cancel the Company’s listing.[6] The Company then applied for a review of the LC Decision. On 4 April 2023, the LRC upheld the LC’s decision.[7]
 
On 17 April 2023, the Company notified the Exchange of its intention to apply for judicial review and request the Exchange to withhold delisting.[8] On 19 April 2023, the Exchange conditionally agreed to defer delisting only if the Company filed a "potentially viable" judicial review application by 26 April 2023.[9]
 
On 25 April 2023, the Company submitted a tripartite agreement involving its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Jiangxi Jiangzhou Union Shipbuilding Co Ltd, the Ruichang Municipal People’s Government and Ruichang Investment Company Limited, promising RMB 700 million funding (“New Information”) and pressed the LD/LRC to reconsider the delisting.[10]
 
On the same day, the LD, materially responded as follows (emphasis in original):[11]
 
 “As set out in our email, the Exchange voluntarily decided to temporarily refrain from             implementing the LRC’s decision based on two conditions: (i) the Company proceeds with the Leave Application promptly on or before 26 April 2023, and (ii) the Company can identify potentially viable grounds for judicial review in the Leave Application.
 
We note that the Company has not yet proceeded with the Leave Application. As the Company has not made the Leave Application, the Exchange is not yet able to assess whether the Company has identified viable grounds for a judicial review. For the avoidance of doubt, the Exchange does not consider that any of the evidence or grounds set out in the letter of 25 April 2023 present a viable ground for judicial review.
 
Both conditions for the Exchange’s voluntary decision to refrain from implementing the LRC’s decision remain unfulfilled.  The Exchange therefore reserves its right to proceed with the cancellation once it has had sight of the grounds of the Leave Application, or if the Company fails to take out the Leave Application by the 26 April 2023 deadline. Should the Exchange subsequently decide to proceed with the cancellation, the Exchange will provide you/the Company with not less than 72 hours’ notice in advance of the publication of the announcement relating to any rescheduled cancellation.”
 
The Company alleged that the above email constituted “decisions” made by both the LD and LRC to (i) refuse to reconsider the cancellation of the Company’s viability, and (ii) reconsider its decision upholding the LC’s decision to cancel the Company’s listing respectively (the “LD Decision” and the “LRC Decision”).[12]
 
Grounds for Judicial Review
 
The Company raised 4 grounds against the LD Decision and the LRC Decision:
 
(a)   Ground 1: The LD Decision was in breach of the LD’s Tameside duty, because the LD failed to consider the effect of the New Information on the Company’s ability to meet the Resumption Guidance.
 
(b)   Ground 2: The LRC Decision was in breach of the LRC’s Tameside duty for substantially similar reasons.
 
(c)   Ground 3: The LD fettered its discretion by refusing to consider new evidence – here, the New Information.  In particular, the LD has the power to consider the delisting of an issuer before the delisting actually happens.
 
(d)   Ground 4: The LRC fettered its discretion by refusing to consider the New Information for substantially similar reasons.  In particular, the LRC is not functus after taking a decision and can re-open a decision it has made provided that the listed issuer’s listing is not cancelled.
 
(C) Decisions
 
The Exchange’s Submissions
 
The Exchange submitted that the alleged LD and LRC Decisions did not exist.  As such, the Company’s intended challenge was doomed to failure from the outset. The Exchange’s arguments are summarized as follows:-[13]
 
(1)    Not every decision by a decision-maker is reviewable. “Intermediate” or procedural decisions, which do not give rise to a substantive consequence, will not be subject to the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

(2)    The declining of an invitation to reconsider a decision does not automatically give rise to a fresh decision which is amenable to judicial review.  It must be shown that, as a matter of substance and reality, such a fresh decision has been made.

(3)    The Court is reluctant to find that there is a fresh reviewable decision where there is reason to believe the applicant seeks to avoid some procedural or substantive requirements.

(4)    An applicant cannot bring himself within time to apply for judicial review under Order 53 rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court Cap 4A “simply by asking the decision-maker to reconsider the application, and then challenge that refusal.
 

The Court's Reasoning

The Court accepted the Exchange’s submissions and dismissed the Company’s application on the following grounds:
 
(1)   No Reviewable Decision
 
(a)   The Delisting Decision was decisive in nature, which was supported by Rule 2B.16, stating that the decision of the LRC shall be “conclusive and binding” on the listed issuer.  From that moment on, there was no further question as to whether the Company would be delisted.[14]
 
(b)   The Company’s challenge targeted the wrong act. The email sent by the Exchange dated 25 April 2023 was not reviewable. The decision which should have been challenged was the Delisting Decision.  However, that challenge had no prospects, because the Company failed to comply with the Resumption Guidance before the prescribed remedial period.[15]
 
(c)   The Company’s challenge was exactly what previous Courts have warned against, namely that applicants should not be allowed to rely on the “softer target” of a reconsideration decision and circumvent a substantive bar (namely, that the Delisting Decision disclosed no public law error). [16]
 
(d)   Permitting such challenges would undermine market certainty, contradicting Rule 6.01A, and Guidance Letter 95-18 (“Guidance Letter”) §§12 and 19, by enabling issuers to prolong delisting indefinitely via “new evidence” submissions.[17]
 
(2)   No Public Law Error
 
(a)   The Exchange was entitled to disregard the Company’s request to reconsider the Delisting Decision without exercising any discretion or carrying out any inquiry. Both Rules 2A.08 and 2B.06, which provide that (1) the LC has reserved to itself the power to cancel the listing of a listed issuer, (2) the LC’s decision (and, if the LRC is requested to review the same, the LRC’s decision) is conclusive and final. Given that only the LC / LRC has the power to cancel a listed issuer, the LD has no power to reconsider the Delisting Decision.[18]
 
(b)   The 18-month remedial period (Rule 6.01A) is not to promote the resumption of trading, but to create an effective delisting framework in light of the Exchange’s statutory objective.  Extending it via “new evidence” would contradict the Exchange’s statutory duty to maintain market certainty.
 
(c)   Neither the LD nor LRC breached any Tameside duty. They had no obligation to entertain the New Information after issuing a final Delisting Decision. 
 
(D) Key Takeaways
 
In conclusion, the above decision provides helpful guidance on the scope of judicial review. Decisions that are “intermediate” or procedural in nature, which do not give rise to a substantive consequence, are not reviewable. Rule 2B.16 of the Listing Rules states LRC decisions are “conclusive and binding”. Once issued, the only remaining question is when delisting occurs. Further, the LD and LRC had no duty to reconsider new information after the issuance of a final delisting decision.

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[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=170769&currpage=T
[2] China Ocean Industry Group Ltd v. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd, §13
[3] Ibid, §22
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid, §24
[6] Ibid, §32
[7] Ibid, §36
[8] Ibid, §4
[9] Ibid, §5
[10] Ibid, §38
[11] Ibid, §7
[12] Ibid, §8
[13] Ibid, §42
[14] Ibid, §43
[15] Ibid
[16] Ibid
[17] Ibid, §45
[18] Ibid, §54

“Second Attempt, Same Outcome”: Hong Kong Courts Uphold the Constitutionality of Hong Kong’s Restriction Notices Regime

(A) Introduction

In Chen Wencan and another v Secretary for Justice and another (“Chen Wencan”),[1] CACV 101/2023, date of judgment: 4 July 2025, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) dismissed the Applicants’ appeal against the refusal of leave to apply for judicial review. The Applicant challenged the constitutionality of Section 207(e) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) (“SFO”) which empowers the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) to issue restriction notices (“RNs”) freezing assets held by licensed corporations during investigations into suspected market misconduct, including “ramp and dump” schemes.

Notably, this ruling reaffirmed an earlier decision in Tam Sze Leung and others v Secretary for Justice and another (“Tam Sze Leung”),[2] HCAL 177/2022, date of judgment: 26 September 2022, the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) similarly upheld the SFC’s authority to issue RNs freezing trading accounts during market misconduct investigations, specifically in relation to “ramp and dump” schemes.

This article examines the above judgments, highlighting the consistent judicial endorsement of the SFC’s powers under the RN regime and the significant legal barriers faced by parties attempting to overturn RNs.

(B) Statutory Framework of RNs

Under the SFO, the SFC may impose RNs through three key powers:

1. Section 204: Restriction of business: The SFC may prohibit a licensed corporation from entering into specific transactions, soliciting specific clients or carrying on business in specific ways.

2. Section 205: Restriction on dealing with property: the SFC may prohibit a licensed corporation from disposing of any relevant property, dealing with any relevant property in a specified manner or not in a specified manner, assisting, counselling or procuring another person to dispose of any relevant property or deal with any relevant property in a specified manner or not in a specified manner, or require a licensed corporation to deal with any relevant property only in, a specified manner.

3. Section 206: Maintenance of property: The SFC may require a licensed corporation to maintain property in or outside Hong Kong such that— (a) the property maintained is of the value and of the description that appear to the SFC to be desirable with a view to ensuring that the licensed corporation will meet its liabilities related to its licensed regulated activity; and (b) the property is maintained to enable the licensed corporation at any time freely to transfer or otherwise dispose of the property.

Section 207 of the SFO authorizes the SFC to exercise these powers against licensed corporations. Section 207(e) was the main issue in both Chen Wencan and Tam Sze Leung.

(C) Tam Sze Leung and others v Secretary for Justice and another

Facts

The case arose from the SFC’s investigation into various persons suspected of engaging in a “Ramp and Dump” market manipulation scheme involving shares of WMCH Global Investment Ltd (stock code: 8208). The SFC issued RNs to 15 licensed corporations in relation to 32 trading accounts held by 26 individuals, including the three Applicants.

The Applicants made a constitutional challenge against the use of RNs issued by the SFC to freeze assets held in their trading accounts with licensed corporations on the ground that the regime for issuing RNs was (1) not “prescribed by law” and (2) a disproportionate interference with property rights.

They argued that the powers under Section 204(1)(a) and 205(1) of the SFO interfere with their property rights guaranteed by Article 6 and Article 105 of the Basic Law (“BL6” and “BL105”). Further, the powers invoked on the basis of Section 207(e) were unconstitutional on two grounds:

(1)   Ground 1 (“Prescribed by Law Ground”)[3]

The relevant provisions fail to meet the ‘prescribed by law’ requirement. The provisions are extremely broad. They can be deployed whenever it “appears” to the SFC that it is merely “desirable” (not even “necessary”) in pursuit of highly vague and undefined objectives such as the broad and open-ended concept of “the public interest”. There is no guidance as to the factors which would be taken into consideration in the SFC’s decision making process. The scope of powers and the manner of their exercise lack sufficient clarity and the regime lacks proper safeguards against abuses and misuses

(2)   Ground 2 (“Proportionality Ground”)[4]

Even if the provisions are thought to be sufficiently certain, the interference with an individual’s property rights guaranteed by BL6 and BL105 goes further than is reasonably necessary and fails step 3 and step 4 of the proportionality test. The required evidential threshold is too low, “in the public interest” as a basis for intervention is too broad, and there is an absence of sufficient safeguards.

Decisions

The Court dismissed both challenges.

(1)   Ground 1 (“Prescribed by Law Ground”):

There are two requirements flowing from the concept of "prescribed by law":[5]

(1)   the law must be adequately accessible, meaning the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case; and

(2)   a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct.

The RN regime must be examined against its statutory context under the SFO.

Section 207(e) Interpretation

The phrase “It appears to the Commission that the imposition of the prohibition or requirement is desirable” requires the SFC to form a view based on available materials, balancing:[6]

(1) the stage of the investigation;

(2) the potentiality of the unfavourable outcome (which might include both its degree of likelihood and its possible gravity of effect) which has been identified by the materials generated by the investigation;

(3) the apparent need to safeguard the rights of others or protect the public interest; and

(4) what the impact will be from the prohibition or requirement in mind – that balancing makes it seem right to do so, namely that it appears to be desirable.

The safeguards against abuses of Section 207(e) come from the involvement of and oversight by the Securities and Futures Appeal Tribunal (“SFAT”).[7] The SFAT’s review is a de novo full merits review. SFAT must exercise its own independent judgment. It has broad powers to confirm, vary or set aside the SFC’s decision, and substitute the decision with any other decision as it considers appropriate.

In light of the above, the Court held that Sections 204 and 205 when invoked on the basis of Section 207(e) satisfy the “prescribed by law” requirement.

(2)   Ground 2 (“Proportionality Ground”):

The proportionality analysis, established in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR, involves the following four steps:[8]

(1) whether the intrusive measure pursues a legitimate aim;

(2) if so, whether it is rationally connected with advancing that aim;

(3) whether the measure is no more than necessary for that purpose; and if the encroaching measure passes the first three steps;

(4) whether a reasonable balance has been struck between the societal benefits of the encroachment and the inroads made into the constitutionally protected rights of the individuals, asking in particular whether pursuit of the societal interest results in an unacceptably harsh burden on the individual.

The legitimate aim of Part X of the SFO is the protection of investors, creditors of the licensed corporation and the public interest.[9] In respect of the public interest, one aspect is the preservation of monies that might otherwise be dissipated, pending the results being known of an investigation into misconduct within the securities and futures industry. The Court found that the restriction/ limitation that is the consequence of the SFC’s interpretation of Sections 204, 205 and 207(e) pursues a legitimate aim. It is rationally connected to that legitimate aim and strikes a reasonable balance between the societal benefits of the encroachment and inroads made with the constitutionally protected rights of the individual, and does not result in an unacceptably harsh burden on the individual.[10]

In light of the above, the Court held that the RN regime satisfied the proportionality test.

(D) Chen Wencan and another v Secretary for Justice and another

The facts of Chen Wencan are similar to those in Tam Sze Leung. The CA reaffirmed and mainly adopted the reasoning in Tam Sze Leung.

Facts

The Applicants appealed against the refusal of the CFI to grant leave for judicial review of 2 RNs issued by the SFC under Sections 204 and 205, on the basis of Section 207(e) of the SFO.

The SFC investigated suspected ramp and dump schemes involving the shares of Skymission Group Holdings Limited and Wei Yuan Holdings Limited conducted by a syndicate, whose suspected members included the Applicants. The SFC issued 2 RNs pursuant to Section 204(1) and 205(1) on the basis of Section 207(e) to freeze the Applicants’ trading accounts.[11]

The Applicants applied for leave for judicial review of (i) Sections 204, 205 and 207(e), and (ii) the RNs, contending that they prohibited the Applicants from dealing with or disposing of their private properties, and constituted a clear restriction on their fundamental right to use their properties under BL6 and BL105.[12]

The Honourable Mr Justice Coleman dismissed their applications and held that the RN regime satisfied both the “prescribed by law” and “proportionality” requirements.[13]

Grounds of Appeal

(1)  Ground 1: The RN Regime does not satisfy the “prescribed by law” requirement and is incompatible with BL6 and BL105.[14]

(2)  Ground 2: The RN Regime amounts to a disproportionate interference with the Applicants’ right to property.[15]

Decisions

The CA held that the RN Regime satisfies both the prescribed by law and proportionality requirements and is constitutionally compliant.

(1)   Ground 1 (“Prescribed by Law Ground”):

The CA upheld the CFI’s rulings on the following grounds:

(1)   While “public interest” under Section 207(e) is broad, its scope is contextually constrained by: (i) the SFC’s statutory functions (SFO Section 5(1) and objectives (SFO Section 4); and (ii) its application only to licensed corporations;[16]

(2)   There are adequate safeguards against abuse of power, including: (i) non-delegable decision-making by the SFC’s independent board; (ii) requirements for reasoned decisions and Gazette publication (SFO Section 209); (iii) rights to seek withdrawal/variation of RNs (SFO Section 208) and merits-based review by the SFAT (SFO Section 217); (iv) judicial review availability.[17]

(3)   The threshold for issuing RNs (“appears desirable”) is not deficient.[18]

(2)   Ground 2 (“Proportionality Ground”):

The CA held that the RN Regime strikes a proportionate balance on the following grounds:

(1)   The measures adopted by the legislature under Sections 204 and 205 are no more than necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of Part X of the SFO, namely, the protection of investors, creditors of the licensed corporation and the public interest (the “Protective Aims”), applying a standard “closer to the ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’ end of the spectrum. The CA added that it would reach the same conclusion even under a stricter standard of review closer to the other end of the reasonableness spectrum.[19]

(2)   The extent of interference with a person’s right to use property under the RN Regime is proportionate to the Protective Aims.[20]

In light of the above, the CA held that the Applicants’ intended challenge to the RN Regime on constitutional grounds was not reasonably arguable, and had no realistic prospects of success.[21] The CFI was correct to refuse to grant leave to apply for judicial review.

(E)  Key Takeaways

In conclusion, Chen Wencan reinforces the Courts’ consistent stance in upholding the constitutionality of RN regime under the SFO. Despite the broad scope of “public interest”, the Courts affirmed that the statutory framework provides adequate safeguards, satisfying the requirements of being “prescribed by law” and proportionate to legitimate public interests. Any future attempts to contest the RN’s constitutionality are likely to face substantial legal hurdles.

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[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=170172&QS=%28%7BChen+Wencan%7D+%25parties%29&TP=JU

[2] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=147488&QS=%28%7BTam+Sze+Leung%7D+%25parties%29&TP=JU

[3] Tam Sze Leung, §53

[4] Ibid, §53

[5] Ibid, §59

[6] Ibid, §103

[7] Ibid, §145

[8] Ibid, §175

[9] Ibid, §185

[10] Ibid, §187

[11] Chen Wencan, §7

[12] Ibid, §24

[13] Ibid, §27

[14] Ibid, §28

[15] Ibid, §28

[16] Ibid, §55

[17] Ibid, §62-63

[18] Ibid, §71

[19] Ibid, §87

[20] Ibid, §88

[21] Ibid, §89