Revisiting Hollington Principle: Hong Kong's Admissibility Boundary for Foreign Judgments

(A) Introduction
 
In Chen Jinhui v Wong Kam San, by his guardian ad litem, Huang Yuexia and others, CACV 178/2021, date of judgment: 17 July 2025,[1] the Hong Kong Court of Appeal addressed applications by the 4^th to 6^th Defendants to adduce new evidence in their appeal against the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Leung (as he then was) dated 19 March 2021 (i.e. Chen Jinhui v Wong Kam San and others, HCA 1524/2012, “19 March 2021 Judgment”[2]). 
 
This case clarifies the principles governing the admission of new evidence in subsequent proceedings. Significantly, it reaffirms and explores the boundaries of the Hollington principle, which generally renders a judgment and factual findings of another court or tribunal in earlier proceedings inadmissible in subsequent proceedings unless binding by issue estoppel. Given the rise in cross-border litigation between Mainland China and Hong Kong, it serves as a helpful reminder of the rules governing foreign judgments, particularly Mainland China judgments which may contain relevant materials, and how Hong Kong's Courts apply these principles.
 
(B) Facts
 
The underlying dispute centered on the Plaintiff’s claim to recover 80% of the shares in Hawkins Development Limited (“Hawkins”).[3] The Plaintiff alleged that those shares were promised to him by the 1^st Defendant, Wong Kam San (“Wong”).[4] These shares, originally held by Wong through his corporate vehicles (the 2^nd Defendant, Line Power Limited, and the 3^rd Defendant, Trengei Development Limited), were transferred to the 4^th Defendant, Lead Success (Hong Kong) Limited (“Lead Success”), and later, upon Lead Success’s plea in the proceedings, to the 6^th Defendant, Superfine Group Limited (“Superfine”), which was subsequently joined to the action.[5]
 
Pursuant to 19 March 2021 Judgment, the Court granted declarations affirming the Plaintiff’s entitlement and ordered Superfine to transfer 80% of Hawkins’ shares to the Plaintiff.[6] In default of such transfer, Superfine was directed to pay the Plaintiff 80% of the shares’ assessed value.[7]
 
Applications to Adduce New Evidence
 
The 4^th to 6^th Defendants applied for leave to adduce the following evidence in support of their appeal against the 19 March 2021 Judgment:[8]

(a)   Item 1- a criminal judgment of the Liaoning Benxi Intermediate People’s Court dated 19 September 2024 (the “Intermediate People’s Court Judgment”);

(b)   Item 2 - an email from Cheng Rui (“Cheng”) to Zhang Rongwen (“Zhang”) dated 29 April 2022 and the attachments thereto, including a purported declaration made by the Plaintiff dated 25 April 2022;

(c)   Item 3 - an email from Cheng to Zhang dated 23 May 2022 and the attachments thereto, including a purported declaration made by the Plaintiff dated 21 May 2022;

(d)   Item 1A - a criminal judgment of the Liaoning Higher People’s Court dated 17 March 2025 (the “Higher People’s Court Judgment”) upholding the Intermediate People’s Court Judgment.
 
(C) Decisions
 
Leave Granted for Items 2 and 3 (Plaintiff's Purported Declarations)
 
The Court noted that Items 2 and 3 were similar to Item 23, which consisted of:

(1)   a purported declaration made by the Plaintiff dated 3 February 2022 (the “Feb 2022 Declaration”), stating that: (a) he was currently under restraint at home because he was suspected of having committed offence(s) of fraud; (b) he had forged various documents which were used in legal proceedings in Hong Kong; (c) he wished to withdraw the proceedings in Hong Kong; and (d) he had asked his appointed Cheng in the PRC to send his declaration to the victims’ lawyers and his own lawyers in Hong Kong; and

(2)   an appointment letter signed by the Plaintiff dated 4 February 2022, whereby the Plaintiff appointed Cheng as his lawyer in relation to his fraud case.
 
Although the Court granted leave to the 4^th to 6^th Defendants to adduce Item 23 as new evidence because of its potential significance, the Court made it clear that there were obvious questions to be asked as to whether the Plaintiff in fact made the alleged admission contained in the Feb 2022 Declaration, and whether such admission (if made) was voluntary, and reserved the question of what weight (if any) ought to be accorded to Item 23 for consideration at the substantive hearing of the appeal.[9]
 
Despite the 4^th to 6^th Defendants’ 2.5-year delay in applying for leave to adduce Items 2–3, the Plaintiff did not object on the ground of delay.[10] He agreed to adduce Items 2 – 3 provided he retained the right to challenge their admissibility, weight, and truthfulness.[11]
 
The 4^th to 6^th Defendants argued the Plaintiff should be barred from challenging admissibility, claiming this issue was settled in the prior ruling on Item 23. The Court rejected their argument as the earlier judgment expressly left open questions about the voluntariness and admissibility of Item 23 and did not preclude similar challenges to Items 2–3.[12] The Court further distinguished between granting leave to adduce new evidence and determining substantive challenges to admissibility, weight, or truthfulness, with the former to be resolved first. 

In light of the above, the Court granted leave to adduce Items 2–3, without prejudice to the Plaintiff’s right to contest their admissibility, weight, and/or truthfulness.[13] The Plaintiff shall have leave to file and serve evidence (if so advised) addressing these issues within 49 days from the date of the Order.[14] The 4^th to 6^th Defendants shall have leave to file and serve evidence in reply (if so advised) within 28 days thereafter.[15]
 
Leave Refused for Items 1 and 1A (Mainland Judgments)
 
Under the Hollington principle, a judgment and factual finding of another court or tribunal in earlier proceedings, whether civil or criminal, is inadmissible in subsequent proceedings, unless the party against whom the finding sought to be deployed is bound by it by reason of an estoppel per rem judicatum.[16] 
 
The Court noted that the factual evidence set out, or summarised, in Items 1 and 1A may constitute admissible hearsay evidence for the purpose of legal proceedings in Hong Kong.[17] However, the Court refused to grant leave for the 4^th to 6^th Defendants to adduce Items 1 and 1A on the following grounds:[18]

(1)   Failure to Identify Admissible Passages: The 4^th to 6^th Defendants applied for leave to adduce the whole Intermediate People’s Court Judgment/Higher People’s Court Judgment as new evidence. They failed to specify passages which constitute admissible evidence for the purpose of their appeal;

(2)   Failure to Classify or Justify Evidence: The 4^th to 6^th Defendants failed to distinguish between the pre-trial new evidence and post-trial new evidence. The Court explained that different principles apply for the admission of pre-trial new evidence and post-trial new evidence.  The admission of pre-trial new evidence is generally governed by the Ladd v Marshall conditions (subject to the Court’s residual discretion to admit the evidence in exceptional circumstances notwithstanding the non-satisfaction of the Ladd v Marshall conditions), while the admission of post-trial new evidence is subject to the Court’s discretion under Order 59, rule 10(2) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A. The materials contained in the Intermediate People’s Court Judgment cover both pre-trial and post-trial new evidence.  The 4^th to 6^th Defendants failed to classify the evidence accordingly; and justify the admission of the proposed new evidence, under either the Ladd v Marshall conditions/the Court’s residual discretion (for pre-trial new evidence) or the Court’s discretion under Order 59, rule 10(2) (for post-trial new evidence).
 
Costs
 
Although the 4^th to 6^th Defendants succeeded in their application regarding Items 2 and 3, the Court ordered them to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the Summons dated 23 January 2025 from 27 February 2025 and the Summons dated 24 April 2025, summarily assessed with certificate for two counsel on the following grounds:[19]

(1) Unreasonable Conduct: The 4^th to 6^th Defendants’ unjustified contest of the Plaintiff’s right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence and opposition to adequate time for the Plaintiff to file and serve evidence in response to the proposed new evidence. As such, the matter could not be resolved by consent; and

(2) Unjustified Delay: The 4^th to 6^th Defendants’ 2.5-year delay in including Items 2–3 in their previous applications for admission of new evidence.
 
(D) Key Takeaways
 
In conclusion, this case illustrates clear distinctions between (1) granting leave to adduce new evidence and determining substantive challenges to admissibility, weight, or truthfulness; and (2) the different frameworks governing the admission of pre-trial new evidence and post-trial new evidence. Further, Hong Kong Courts strictly apply the Hollington principle, which renders a judgment or factual finding of another court or tribunal in earlier proceedings inadmissible in subsequent proceedings unless binding under estoppel per rem judicatum.
 
Parties should (1) accurately categorize evidence as pre-trial or post-trial; and (2) specifically identify the relevant passages (for example, paragraphs, sections) they propose to rely on. Such identification is necessary for the Court’s exercise of discretion to grant leave. For foreign judgments, identifying relevant passages which constitute admissible evidence enhances prospects of obtaining leave to adduce them as new evidence.  Besides, unreasonable conduct (for example, meritless admissibility challenges, unjustifiable delays in applying for leave) may trigger adverse costs orders even when leave is granted for adducing new evidence.
 

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[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=170555&currpage=T
[2]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=134350&QS=%28%7BWong+Kam+San%7D+%25parties%29&TP=JU
[3] 19 March 2021 Judgment, §1
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid, §255
[7] Ibid
[8] Chen Jinhui v Wong Kam San, by his guardian ad litem, Huang Yuexia and others, CACV 178/2021, §1 (https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=148468&QS=%28%7BWong+Kam+San%7D+%25parties%29&TP=JU)
[9] Chen Jinhui v Wong Kam San, by his guardian ad litem, Huang Yuexia and Others, CACV 173/2021 & CACV 178/2021, date of judgment: 4 November 2022, §52
[10] Chen Jinhui v Wong Kam San, by his guardian ad litem, Huang Yuexia and others, CACV 178/2021, §6
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid, §9
[13] Ibid, §18
[14] Ibid
[15] Ibid
[16] Ibid, §15
[17] Ibid, §16
[18] Ibid
[19] Ibid, §21