(A) Introduction
The landscape of personal injury litigation in Hong Kong has continued to evolve at pace. This article examines the key developments in 2025 across three major areas: (1) the expansion and clarification of liability principles; (2) the strict enforcement of case management protocols; and (3) the judicial guidance on obtaining expert medical evidence.
Regarding liability, we analyze three significant cases that explore the scope of duty of care, from an employer’s responsibility during extreme weather to the limits of an occupier’s statutory duty, together with a stark judicial reminder on the need for realistic assessments of both merits and quantum.
Regarding case management, we examine three important decisions highlighting the courts’ robust approach to procedural compliance where wasted costs orders have been increasingly imposed for non-compliant conduct.
Regarding expert evidence, building on the landmark ruling in Rai Chandra Kala v. La Creperie 8 Limited and others [2023] HKDC 671, [1] two notable judgments in 2025 have provided concrete direction for practitioners, moving from proposals for reform to a clear framework applicable across all court levels.
By analyzing these cases, this article reflects on the emerging trends that shaped personal injury practice over the past year and considers their implications for 2026.
(B) Landmark Cases on Liability and Quantum
The past year brought remarkable refinement to the principles of duty and damages. Three cases stand out: the first expands employer liability during extreme weather, the second clarifies the statutory limits of an occupier’s duty and the third issues a strong warning against unmeritorious defence and inflated quantum claims.
Employer’s Duty during Extreme Weather
Khan Farooq Ahmed v. Delivery Hero Food Hong Kong Ltd formerly known as Rocket Food Ltd [2025] HKCFI 4030, date of judgment: 3 September 2025, [2] underscores an employer’s duty to develop and implement a safe system of work during extreme weather. Employers must ensure that safety protocols are practical, consistent with terms of employment contract and aligned with the official guidelines and/or code of practices, for example, those issued by the Labour Department.
The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a food delivery worker. [3] On the day of the accident, his shift was scheduled from 2000 hours to 0000 hours and he began work at around 1930 hours. At 2240, typhoon signal no. 8 (“T8”) was issued by the Hong Kong Observatory. [4] The Plaintiff completed his last order at 2258 hours. The accident occurred when he had finished his last order and was on his way home. When he was riding his motorcycle, he was blown off by a sudden strong gust of wind, causing him to lose his balance and fall onto the road. [5]
The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant operated an unsafe system of work when it allowed its riders to accept orders when they knew that T8 “was about to be issued”. In particular, whether the system of work can still be said to be safe when not only it allowed the riders to accept orders right up to the minute before T8 was issued, but also expected any order which had been accepted by the riders to be fulfilled and completed while T8 was in force. [6]
The Court held that the Defendant was liable for the accident on the following grounds:
(1) The Defendant breached its duty of care owed to the Plaintiff in negligence, the implied terms of the employment contract and the statutory duty under the Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance, Cap. 509 (“OSHO”). [7]
(2) The Telegram messages directly contradicted the terms of the Plaintiff’s employment contract with the Defendant. [8] The “Amendment to Employment” signed by the Plaintiff with the Defendant on 13 June 2018 (the “Amendment”) stipulated that by accepting a job after a T8 was hoisted, the Plaintiff implicitly agreed to deliver under those conditions. Further, if T8 was raised during a delivery, he was implicitly required to continue unless he contacted a dispatcher with a valid reason to stop. The Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff was free to decline orders as the riders’ income and performance rating depend on order acceptance and completion rates and demand peaked during adverse weather. [9] Therefore, the system of work operated by the Defendant under T8 was unsafe. [10]
(3) The Defendant, as the operator of the system, was responsible for ensuring it could be shut down in a timely manner to prevent workers from being exposed to the dangers of working under T8. By requiring riders to complete deliveries after T8 was issued, the Defendant exposed the Plaintiff and his co-workers to an unnecessary risk of injury. [11]
(4) The Defendant failed to provide the riders with an effective communication system. The Telegram was an ineffective communication system because it required riders to close the delivery app to see messages, which was an unreasonable expectation during T8, one of their busiest periods. Further, by requesting its employees including the Plaintiff to sign the Amendment, the Defendant attempted to get round the Code of Practice in Times of Typhoon and Rainstorms issued by the Labour Department (the “Code”) which advised all employees to suspend all outdoor work in exposed areas and take shelter in a safe place during typhoon. Therefore, the Defendant breached the Code. [12]
The Court found the Plaintiff’s contributory negligence to be 20% on the following grounds: [13]
(1) The Plaintiff failed to read the various messages on Telegram issued by D to the riders, in particular the First Message, regarding the imminent hoisting of T8 before the accident; and
(2) The Plaintiff failed to find a safe place or shelter before he decided to drive home in his motorcycle.
The Limit of an Occupier’s Statutory Duty
Man Pui Shing v. International Paper Manufacturing & Distribution Ltd and others [2025] HKDC 16, date of judgment: 16 January 2025, [14] clarifies the scope of an occupier’s liability under Section 7 of the OSHO. This case draws a clear line between an occupier’s duty regarding the physical state of premises and potential liability for unsafe activities conducted on the premises. It confirms that an occupier’s statutory liability is not a catch-all for workplace accident. Claimants/ Plaintiffs should correctly identify both the cause of action (whether it arises from a dangerous state of the premises or from a dangerous activity) and the responsible tortfeasor(s). Otherwise, they may face an adverse costs order, subject to the Court’s discretion.
The Plaintiff claimed damages against the Defendants for the injuries suffered by him as a result of an accident that took place on 3 October 2017 at a recycling workshop (the “Premises”) when the Plaintiff was hit by a reversing forklift truck (the “Forklift”) driven by Ma Kam Fook (“Ma”). [15]
The Court held that although the 1st Defendant was an occupier of the Premises, it was not liable under Section 7 of OSHO on the following grounds: [16]
(1) Following HKSAR v. China Overseas Building Construction Ltd [2007] 2 HKLRD 216, the Court affirmed that the duty under Section 7 of OSHO is confined to ensuring the safety of the physical state of the premises, including means of access and egress and any plant or substances kept there. It does not extend to liability for unsafe activities or systems of work conducted on the premises.
(2) The accident was caused solely by the manner of driving the Forklift by Ma, not by the state of the Premises or the state of the Forklift.
(3) The alleged lack of clear warning signs and demarcated zones concerned the system of work, not the state of the Premises. Similarly, the absence of side mirrors or a reverse alarm on the forklift did not render the plant itself unsafe.
Furthermore, the Court held that the 1st Defendant owed no common law duty of care to the Plaintiff. The 1st Defendant sublet the Premises to the 2nd Defendant for its operation of the recycling business, sold all its machinery, dismissed all its employee on the Premises and had no control over Ma, the Forklift (purchased by the 2nd Defendant) or the system of work at the Premises. As such, the Court held that there was no sufficient foreseeability or proximity to impose a duty of care on the 1st Defendant. [17]
As for costs, given that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant was dismissed, the Court held that the Plaintiff shall pay the 1st Defendant’s costs of the main action, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for Counsel. [18]
Judicial Scrutiny of Unmeritorious Defence and Exaggerated Quantum
Chan Ming Kit v. Luk Kwok Keung [2025] HKDC 1047, date of judgment: 30 June 2025 [19] serves as a valuable reminder that parties and their legal representatives must assess claims realistically from the outset. The Court remarked that “this case has been badly handled by the parties (and no less, their respective legal representatives) on multiple levels” and expressed the hope that it would “see no more of that in future cases”. [20] Parties and their legal advisers must realistically evaluate the value of a claim and commence proceedings in the appropriate jurisdiction. Pursuing a claim in the wrong court results in a waste of time and costs. Most importantly, legal representatives, who are professional administrators appointed by the Court, owe a duty to the Court not to pursue unmeritorious arguments. It is unacceptable to justify submissions on the basis of client instructions when those instructions are unmeritorious or unreasonable. [21]
On liability, the Court held that the Defendant was negligent in causing the accident on the following grounds:
(1) The Defendant was convicted of careless driving as a result of the accident, so he had the burden of proof to show that he was not negligent in the accident. The Court found that the Defendant lied in his police witness statement and in his evidence. [22]
(2) The camera footages contradicted the Defendant’s version of events and showed that he was negligent in causing the accident. [23]
(3) Given the abruptness of the Defendant’s decision to cut into the left 1st lane in front of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, the Plaintiff could not be faulted for not being able to avoid any collision. [24]
As for costs on liability, the Court ordered that the Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs on (1) the issue of liability for the main action and (2) the counterclaim, to be taxed on indemnity basis if not agreed, with certificate for counsel, subject to the wasted costs order (which set out in Section C below). The Court expressly stated that the Defendant should be penalized by indemnity costs for putting forward false evidence on how the accident happened. It also found that judicial resources were wasted and that the Defendant’s pursuit of a hopeless defence on liability amounted to an abuse of the court’s process. [25]
On quantum, the Court awarded the Plaintiff damages of HK$70,500 (which was around 25% of his total claim of HK$272,818.89). This significant reduction was based on the following grounds:
(1) The Plaintiff sustained only trivial injuries as a result of the accident. The Court noted that the impact of the collision was minor and hence any resulting discomfort should have resolved within a few days. [26]
(2) The Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient objective medical evidence to substantiate his claim of residual disabilities lasting for months. [27]
(3) The Court found that the Plaintiff exaggerated the extent of his residual pain. [28]
(4) The Court was not satisfied that the Plaintiff had suffered any loss of earnings during sick leave. [29]
As for costs on quantum, given the minor nature of the injuries, the Court held that the Plaintiff should have known at the commencement of this case that he would only have reasonable prospects to recover damages within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal. The Court also found it appropriate to award costs on this basis given the Plaintiff’s failure to put sufficient evidence to prove his alleged pre-trial loss of earnings. As such, the Court held that the Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs on the issue of quantum in the main action at a scale commensurate to those awarded by the Small Claims Tribunal, subject to the wasted costs order set out in Section C below. For procedural economy, the Court summarily assessed the Plaintiff’s costs on the issue of quantum at HK$5,000. [30]
(C) Case Management: Wasted Costs Orders for Non-Compliance
Recent personal injury cases demonstrate the robust approach of Hong Kong courts in exercising their case management powers and underscore their commitment to the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform, particularly promoting procedural economy and ensuring the fair distribution of judicial resources. Legal representatives must adhere to their overriding duty to the court, failing which they may face personal liability for wasted costs. If the lay client gives instructions contrary to the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform, it is incumbent upon the legal representatives to advise their client accordingly and persuade him/her to retract such instructions.
The Consequences of a Poorly Prepared Witness Statement
In Chan Yuet Chun v. Hospital Authority [2024] HKDC 1991 (date of judgment: 2 December 2024) [31] and Chan Yuet Chun v. Hospital Authority [2025] HKDC 42 (date of decision on costs: 8 January 2025) [32], the Defendant successfully applied to strike out substantial parts of the Plaintiff’s witness statement filed on 15 December 2023 (“P’s WS”) under Order 1A rule 1, Order 1B rule 1(2)(1), Order 20 rule 8, Order 38 rule 2A(8) of the Rules of the District Court, Cap. 336H (“RDC”) and inherent jurisdiction of the court.
The Court found that most of the disputed paragraphs of P’s WS contain unnecessary over-elaborations, extensive recitation of records and irrelevant materials, resulting in more than half of its contents being expunged. [33] It held that P’s WS was prepared in an unreasonable, unsatisfactory, frivolous and cost-disproportionate manner, in blatant disregard of the rules under Order 38 rule 2A of the RDC and the legal principles. [34] As a result, under Order 62 rule 8A of the RDC, the Court made a wasted costs order against the Plaintiff’s solicitors on its motion. [35]
Strict Adherence to Practice Directions
Anthonia Louise Zoya Anton v. Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company Limited and another [2025] HKCFI 2445, date of judgment: 6 June 2025, [36] underscores the strict duty to comply with Practice Direction 5.4.
The Plaintiff’s Counsel failed to lodge skeleton submissions by the deadline set out in paragraph 12 of Practice Direction 5.4 (i.e. by 10:00 am, 10 October 2024). Instead, he submitted the submissions only on 14 October 2024 at 10:18 a.m., less than 24 hours before the appeal hearing. As such, the Court had insufficient time to prepare for the case and the appeal hearing was adjourned.
The Plaintiff’s Counsel argued that the delay was caused by the late receipt of the 2nd Defendant’s appeal hearing bundle and his pupil’s inability to notify the Court of the anticipated delay on 9 October 2024 due to missing contact details for the judge’s clerk.
The Court rejected all the arguments raised by the Plaintiff’s Counsel on the following grounds:
(1) A party’s duty to lodge his submissions and list of authorities is independent of the duty of his opponent when observing the timeline stated under Practice Direction 5.4. The Plaintiff’s Counsel could and should have prepared his own submissions and lodged them with the Court regardless of receiving the 2nd Defendant’s submissions. [37]
(2) The contact details of the clerk of the Court were public information available on the Judiciary’s directory and website. There was no valid reason for the failure to notify the Court. Even if notified, late submission would still breach paragraph 12 of Practice Direction 5.4, making adjournment inevitable.
Applying the test from Ma So So v. Chin Yuk Lun & Another [2004] 3 HKLRD 294 and endorsing the principles in Chiu Sui Ching v. Cheng Kwai Hung & Others [2023] HKCFI 1417, the Court held that the failure, which need not involve dishonesty, constituted an “improper act or omission” and a serious dereliction of duty. A gross neglect of inaccuracy in a matter which it is a legal representative’s duty to ascertain with accuracy will suffice. The conduct must be inexcusable and such as to merit reproof. [38]
Besides, the Court referred to paragraph 30 of Practice Direction 5.4 regarding consequences of non-compliance and stated that the failure to comply with the directions contained in the Practice Direction, in the absence of any satisfactory explanations, can amount to serious dereliction of duty on the part of an advocate and should be penalized in costs. [39]
In light of the above, the Court found that the Plaintiff's Counsel's failure to lodge submissions on time constituted an improper act/omission and a serious dereliction of duty. This breach directly caused the adjournment and wasted costs. [40] The conduct was inexcusable and merited reproof. As such, the Plaintiff’s Counsel was held personally responsible for the wasted costs incurred as a result of the adjournment of the hearing on 15 October 2024, including the costs of the 2nd Defendant’s solicitors and the 2nd Defendant’s Counsel in attending the hearing on that day. [41]
Separately, the Court clarified the procedure for seeking a “waiver” under paragraph 29 of Practice Direction 5.4. Such “waiver” cannot be obtained from the opposing party or parties. It must be obtained from the court. Notably, the duty under paragraph 12 of Practice Direction 5.4 is owed to the Court and not to his opponent. As such, it is wrong and inappropriate for a party to approach the opposing party or parties to either notify them or seek their indulgence or consent for the lateness in lodging their skeleton submissions or list of authorities. [42]
Proportionality in Time Estimates and Trial Bundles
Chan Ming Kit v. Luk Kwok Keung [2025] HKDC 1047, date of judgment: 30 June 2025, [43] focused on the parties’ unrealistic time estimates and the inclusion of irrelevant correspondence in the trial bundle.
This case was a usual run-of-the mill traffic cases which was set down in the Fixture List with 4 days reserved. The Court found that the legal representatives on both sides failed to assist the court to promote procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings and to ensure that judicial resources are distributed fairly. Given the estimate trial length of 4 days, hearings for other cases were delayed to accommodate this case and the 2 hearing dates vacated were ultimately vacated and wasted. [44] As such, the Court held that the legal representatives should bear on their own the costs of and occasioned by the preparation of the certificates for time estimate and the application for setting down. [45]
In addition, the Court found that the trial bundle, which was 245 pages, included 27 items of largely irrelevant correspondence (around 60 pages), inserted at the insistence of the Defendant’s solicitors. The Court highlighted that the duty to prepare trial bundles in an efficient manner rested on the legal representatives, who must advise clients against instructions that contradict the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform. [46] As such, the Court held that the costs of and occasioned by the agreement of trial bundle index should be borne by the Defendant’s solicitors personally, to be taxed on indemnity basis if not agreed. [47]
(D) Clarifying the Path: Single Joint Expert or Joint Medical Examination?
The question of whether medical expert evidence should be obtained through a Single Joint Expert (“SJE”) or a Joint Medical Examination by separate experts (“JME”) has undergone significant judicial refinement, from initial proposal for a wider use of SJE in the District Court to a clear legal framework applicable all court levels with no automatic default in favour of either approach.
The Initial Proposal: Sparking Reform
This issue was first brought into focus in Rai Chandra Kala v. La Creperie 8 Limited and another [2023] HKDC 671, date of judgment: 19 May 2023. [48] The Court questioned whether it was time for the court to review the exercise of its management power provided under the Civil Justice Reform and Practice Directions 18.1 (“PD 18.1”) and to promote the wider use of SJEs in PI cases, especially those in the District Court. [49] This case introduced a proposed protocol directing parties to jointly report their agreed SJE to the court, failing which the court would select one from nominated candidates.
Expanding the Proposal to the High Court
Subsequently, in Chen Muchao v. Eagle Sun Engineering Limited [2025] HKCFI 2688, date of judgment: 25 June 2025, [50] the Court proposed the expanded use of SJEs in the High Court. It explained that except for cases involved very severe and multi-faceted injuries, obtaining opinions from two different experts in the same field would be unhelpful and counterproductive when one SJE would suffice. [51] It further concluded that using SJE reports in personal injuries cases in the High Court would save costs and unnecessary arguments and facilitate early settlement of cases.
Establishing the Legal Framework
The underlying legal principles were clarified 2 days later in Tamang Dhirendra v. Toko Construction & Machinery Limited and another [2025] HKCFI 2037, date of judgment: 27 June 2025. [52] The Court highlighted that the obtaining of medical expert evidence is governed by Order 38 rule 4A and PD 18.1, which apply equally to both levels of courts. [53] It held that the question under Order 38, rule 4A(4) is whether it is in the interests of justice to direct for appointment of a SJE after taking into account all the circumstances of the cases, including the factors set out under Order 38, rule 4A(5). [54] Notably, it clarified that there is no default position in favour of an SJE. The appropriateness must be determined on a case-by-case basis. [55]
Additionally, the Court explained that there is a high threshold for a party seeking to change or adduce further expert evidence after obtaining SJE evidence. As such, parties should first consider applying for leave to seek clarification from the SJE in respect of his opinion in his report or draft report. [56]
(E) Way Forward for 2026
In conclusion, 2025 is a pivotal year for personal injuries litigation, setting clear trends that are expected to intensify and define practice in 2026. Looking ahead, the following key developments are anticipated to shape the landscape:
(1) Liability and Quantum: Heightened Scrutiny of Practical Safety Duties and Realistic Claim Assessment
Courts will interpret the duty of care owed by employers with greater emphasis on practical implementation and substantive safety, rather than contractual formalities. They will closely scrutinize systems of work for their real-world operation and alignment with official safety guidelines.
Further, courts will take a more proactive role in assessing the merits of claims and defences, with serious cost consequences for parties pursuing unsustainable positions or inflated quantum.
(2) Case Management: Zero Tolerance for Procedural Non-Compliance
Courts will take a more robust approach in case management and use wasted costs orders as a key tool to enforce compliance. Procedural deadlines, particularly under those under Practice Directions, will be treated as strict obligations owed to the courts. Non‑compliance is likely to result in personal costs sanctions against legal representatives.
Besides, the principle of proportionality will be rigorously applied to time estimates, trial bundle preparation and witness statements. Legal representatives must justify the scope and volume of their work, as unnecessary or disproportionate steps will be penalized.
(3) Expert Evidence: Consolidation of the Case-Specific Framework
The legal framework for obtaining medical expert evidence is now clearly established. With no default presumption in favour of either a SJE or a JME, the onus is on parties to argue for the appropriate approach based on the specific circumstances of the cases.
Given the high threshold for changing expert or adducing further expert evidence after obtaining SJE evidence, strategic focus will shift towards maximizing the utility of the initial expert process. In such circumstances, parties will be expected to seek clarifications from the appointed SJE before applying for leave to adduce additional expert evidence.
[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=152670
[2] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=172089
[3] Khan Farooq Ahmed v. Delivery Hero Food Hong Kong Ltd formerly known as Rocket Food Ltd [2025] HKCFI 4030, date of judgment: 3 September 2025, §3
[4] Ibid, §19
[5] Ibid, §10
[6] Ibid, §24
[7] Ibid, §57
[8] Ibid, §43
[9] Ibid, §46
[10] Ibid, §47
[11] Ibid, §50-52
[12] Ibid, §56
[13] Ibid, §65, §70
[14] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=165757
[15] Man Pui Shing v. International Paper Manufacturing & Distribution Ltd and others [2025] HKDC 16, date of judgment: 16 January 2025, §1
[16] Ibid, §79-87
[17] Ibid, §92
[18] Ibid, §150
[19] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=170060
[20] Chan Ming Kit v. Luk Kwok Keung [2025] HKDC 1047, date of judgment: 30 June 2025, §1
[21] The Court of Appeal has recently issued a similar warning to legal practitioners in the Joint and Several Trustee of the Property of So Ching Wan v. Assen Ltd (in Liquidation) and others [2025] HKCA 1107, date of judgment: 11 December 2025. The Court stated that lawyers "owe a duty to the Court not to pursue unmeritorious arguments. It is not acceptable that they should make such submissions said to be based on the insistence of their client’s instructions no matter how unmeritorious or unreasonable these instructions are. In appropriate cases, wasted costs order will be imposed for such an approach".
[22] Chan Ming Kit v. Luk Kwok Keung [2025] HKDC 1047, date of judgment: 30 June 2025, §14
[23] Ibid
[24] Chan Ming Kit v. Luk Kwok Keung [2025] HKDC 1047, date of judgment: 30 June 2025, §21
[25] Ibid, §77
[26] Ibid, §28.1
[27] Ibid, §28.2
[28] Ibid, §28.3
[29] Ibid, §35
[30] Ibid, §78
[31] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=164758
[32] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=165564
[33] Chan Yuet Chun v. Hospital Authority [2024] HKDC 1991, date of judgment: 2 December 2024, §50
[34] Ibid, §58
[35] Chan Yuet Chun v. Hospital Authority [2025] HKDC 42, date of decision on costs: 8 January 2025, §5
[36] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=169443
[37] Anthonia Louise Zoya Anton v. Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company Limited and another [2025] HKCFI 2445, date of judgment: 6 June 2025, §38
[38] Ibid, §30
[39] Ibid, §33
[40] Ibid, §46
[41] Ibid, §49-§51
[42] Ibid, §41
[43] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=170060
[44] Chan Ming Kit v. Luk Kwok Keung [2025] HKDC 1047, date of judgment: 30 June 2025, §55
[45] Ibid, §56
[46] Ibid, §63
[47] Ibid, §64
[48] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=152670
[49] Rai Chandra Kala v. La Creperie 8 Limited and another [2023] HKDC 671, date of judgment: 19 May 2023, §2
[50] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=169942
[51] Chen Muchao v. Eagle Sun Engineering Limited [2025] HKCFI 2688, date of judgment: 25 June 2025, §74
[52] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=170012
[53] Tamang Dhirendra v. Toko Construction & Machinery Limited and another [2025] HKCFI 2037, date of judgment: 27 June 2025, §13
[54] Ibid, §18
[55] Ibid, §24
[56] Ibid, §46
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