(A) Introduction
Re Tsoi Man (HCB 5570/2025, date of judgment: 26 January 2026) (“Tsoi Man”), [1] Re Tritech Distribution Ltd (HCCW 458/2025, date of judgment: 23 January 2026) (“Tritech”) [2] and Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia e Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) Limitada v. Carmon Restrutura Ltd and another (HCA 1812/2022, date of judgment: 26 January 2026) (“Carmon”) [3] underscore the Hong Kong courts’ strict approach to procedural compliance and case management in litigation and insolvency proceedings.
Tsoi Man highlights the Bankruptcy Court’s expectation that petitioners adhere strictly to the procedural requirements of the Bankruptcy Rules (Cap. 6A) (“BR”). The Court emphasized that pursuing bankruptcy in a “sloppy manner” and asking the Court to overlook defects and errors in the statutory demand and petition is unacceptable, particularly when the debtor has specifically raised such matters as grounds in opposition to the petition. [4]
Tritech reaffirms the established principle and rationale behind the standard practice of imposing conditions for late filing of evidence. The Court highlighted that compliance with statutory time limits is necessary to enable the court to effectively manage and potentially dispose of matters at the first hearing and that late filing causes prejudice by depriving parties and the court of sufficient preparation time.
Carmon indicates the Court’s rejection of last-minute tactical applications that disrupt trial preparation. The Court viewed an attempt to introduce 187 pages of new documents two days before trial as an ambush and an abuse of process. This stance is particularly stringent in the post-Civil Justice Reform (“CJR”) era where trial dates are “milestone dates” which cannot be moved except in special circumstances. Further, the Court found that the Defendants’ 15-minute time estimate for the hearing was a gross and unrealistic underestimation, deliberately calculated to circumvent the requirement under Practice Direction 5.4 for a written skeleton argument in any hearing expected to exceed 30 minutes. Therefore, such conduct was unreasonable and unacceptable.
(B) Facts
Re Tsoi Man (HCB 5570/2025, date of judgment: 26 January 2026)
Re Tsoi Man (HCB 5570/2025, date of judgment: 26 January 2026)
By Petition presented on 18 July 2025, the petitioner, Sun Kong Petroleum Company Limited (the “Petitioner”) sought a bankruptcy order against the debtor, Mr Tsoi Man (the “Debtor”), on the ground that he failed to comply with a statutory demand dated 29 April 2025 (the “SD”) requiring him to pay HK$3,806,719.20 (the “Debt”). [5]
In the SD, the Debt was claimed to have arisen from a supply agreement covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2025 (the “Supply Agreement”) between the Petitioner and a company named Nanyang International Shipping Ltd (“Nanyang”). The Petitioner relied on a deed of guarantee dated 10 May 2024 (the “2024 Guarantee”), under which the Debtor purport guaranteed Nanyang’s obligations. [6]
In the Petition, the Petitioner referred to a Deed of Guarantee dated 10 May 2025 (the “2025 Guarantee”), under which the Debtor purported to guarantee Nanyang’s obligations under the supply agreement dated 6 January 2025 (“2025 Agreement”). [7]
The Debtor opposed the petition. His main defence was that (1) he did not sign the 2025 Guarantee; (2) the 2024 Guarantee did not cover the 2025 Agreement. [8]
In its reply affirmations, the Petitioner sought to raise new matters. None of which had been referred to in the SD or pleaded in the Petition. [9]
Re Tritech Distribution Ltd (HCCW 458/2025, date of judgment: 23 January 2026)
At the first Monday morning hearing of the Petition filed on 28 July 2025 (the “Petition”) on 13 October 2025, the Court granted condition leave for Tritech Distribution Limited (the “Company”) to file and serve the Affirmation of Ip Ka Wai Charlie dated 6 October 2025 out of time, conditional upon payment of US$22,500,000 being 50% of the underlying debt of the Petition (the “Order”). [10]
Subsequently, the Company applied for leave to appeal against the Order on the following grounds: [11]
(1) The payment condition imposed by the Court would effectively bring the dispute to Hong Kong Court while it should have been litigated in the foreign court in favour of which the parties have agreed to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
(2) The Foreign Proceedings Condition should be imposed instead.
Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia e Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) Limitada v. Carmon Restrutura Ltd and another (HCA 1812/2022, date of judgment: 26 January 2026)
On 21 January 2026 (at 3:46 pm according to the Registry’s record), only two clear days before the trial (26 January 2026), the Defendants (“Ds”) filed a summons (“Ds Summons”) to make discovery of a total of 187 pages of new documents. Ds’ Summons was supported by the 10th Affidavit of the 2nd Defendant (“10th Cuenda”). [12]
Ds’ Summons was fixed to be heard at 10:00 am on 26 January 2026, before the commencement of the trial itself. Ds’ solicitors provided a time estimate of 15 minutes for the hearing and did not file any skeleton submissions. [13]
(C) Decision
Re Tsoi Man (HCB 5570/2025, date of judgment: 26 January 2026)
The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Petition on the following grounds:
(1) The Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirement under Rule 56 of the BR as no verifying affidavit was filed. The statement the Petitioner’s reply affirmation did not satisfy the prescribed wording in Form 11 of the Bankruptcy (Forms) Rules (Cap. 6B). Further, the verifying statement, which claimed that the contents of the Petition “are all true and accurate” was factually incorrect as it was undisputed that the Debtor never executed the 2025 Guarantee. [14]
(2) There were glaring inconsistencies between the SD and the Petition regarding the Petitioner’s case but the Petitioner made no attempt to amend the SD or the Petition. In particular: [15]
(a) In the SD, the Petitioner referred to a supply agreement without mentioning its date whereas in the Petition, the Petitioner referred to 2025 Agreement; and
(b) In the SD, the date of the Guarantee was 10 May 2024 while in the Petition, the Petitioner relied on 2025 Guarantee.
(3) It was arguable that the 2024 Guarantee did not cover the debt claimed by the Petitioner.
The Court highlighted that a bankruptcy petition is a serious matter affecting an individual’s status. As such, it expects petitioners to strictly comply with procedural rules and to promptly rectify any mistakes in the statutory demand or petition. This case serves as a stark warning that a petitioner should not pursue bankruptcy proceedings in a sloppy manner and ask the Court to ignore defects and errors, particularly when the debtor has specifically raised such matters as grounds in opposition to the petition. [16]
Re Tritech Distribution Ltd (HCCW 458/2025, date of judgment: 23 January 2026)
The Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the Order. Its reasoning is as follows:
(1) The Court reaffirmed that it is a “decade-long standard practice” to impose a condition upon leave to file an opposing affirmation out of time according to Practice Direction 3.1 §16.1. The rationale for this practice is that late filing of the opposing affirmation deprives the petitioner and the Court of any or any sufficient time before the Monday morning hearing to determine whether the matter could be disposed of immediately at the Monday morning hearing. The Court considers all the relevant factors holistically in the exercise of its discretion, including whether there would be any prejudice caused by the late filing. [17]
(2) The Court expressed dissatisfaction that despite repeated judicial warnings since at least 2015 and the subsequent codification in Practice Direction 3.1 §16.1 dated 30 June 2023, the Companies Court and the Bankruptcy Court continue to face with late applications for filing opposing affirmations out of time accompanied by arguments that no condition should be imposed without proper evidence to substantiate such arguments (for example, a specific timeline to explain why despite prompt actions taken, more time would still be needed). [18]
(3) The Court clarified that the rationale for the payment condition is to ensure the company to take the matter seriously and promptly and enable the Court to determine whether the petition could be disposed of immediately at the first Monday morning hearing. It is not a ruling on the merits of the dispute or an attempt to assert jurisdiction over a matter subject to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. [19]
(4) The Court held that there was no inconsistency between a payment condition and a Foreign Proceedings Condition. They were not mutually exclusive. The former sanctions procedural delay, while the latter ensures compliance with a jurisdictional agreement. As such, both can be imposed together if appropriate. [20]
(5) The Court rejected the Company’s argument that the subsequent commencement of Singapore arbitration proceedings on 24 October 2025 rendered the payment condition inappropriate. The appeal was against the exercise of discretion based on the circumstances as of 13 October 2025. The Company had provided no evidence of difficulty in satisfying the condition and the existence of the arbitration proceedings could be addressed through separate case management applications, not by challenging the Order. [21]
(6) In light of the above, the Court found that the intended appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and was not in the interests of justice. [22]
Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia e Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) Limitada v. Carmon Restrutura Ltd and another (HCA 1812/2022, date of judgment: 26 January 2026)
First, the Court found Ds’ 15-minute estimate to be unreasonable and unacceptable on the following grounds: [23]
(1) It was a gross and unrealistic underestimation for an application concerning 187 pages of new documents.
(2) It was designed to circumvent the requirement under Practice Direction 5.4 that written skeleton argument would be required for any hearing more than 30 minutes before a judge sitting in chambers.
The Court dismissed Ds’ Summons with costs on an indemnity basis, with certificate for two counsel, in favour of the Plaintiff (“P”) on the following grounds:
(1) The Court found that Ds’ Summons was an “obvious and tactically timed ambush of P”. Ds’ Summons was issued 2 clear days before trial, the minimum amount of time required for a summons to be heard without leave of the court for abridging of time. No explanation was given as to why it was issued at such late stage. [24]
(2) At the Pre-Trial Review hearing on 14 October 2025 (“PTR”), the learned deputy judge specifically mentioned that the court is “always skeptical of any late application”. P’s Counsel also specifically stated for the record at that hearing that there should not be any attempt for making any last-minute applications. Ds’ Summons contravened this judicial guidance. [25]
(3) The Court found that although Ds’ Summons was dressed up as a discovery of documents application, in essence, D2 was trying to put in a “supplemental witness statement” in the form of 10th Cuenda in order to introduce those documents and bolster Ds’ defence. This was a “back door” way of trying to do something that they had been specifically warned by the court not to do at the PTR. The Court did not and should not condone to this kind of litigation conduct. [26]
(4) The Court rejected Ds’ claim that the 187 pages of new documents caused no prejudice. If the Court allowed Ds’ Summons, it would inevitably cause an adjournment of the trial as P would need time to study those documents and to respond to them, including filing supplemental witness statements and/or making further discovery, and possibly amending their pleadings. Under the CJR, the dates reserved for the trial are “milestone dates” which cannot be moved for reasons such as last-minute discovery. [27]
(5) The Court found that the new documents were highly questionable. The issues were disputed provenance of WhatsApp messages, questionable relevance of emails, PowerPoints and foreign court documents concerning different legal proceedings. Part of the proposed evidence was untranslated. Therefore, the manner of introduction was described as “sloppy” and “totally unacceptable”. [28]
(D) Key Takeaways
The above three cases are significant on the following grounds:
(1) Strict Procedural Compliance: The cases underscore the necessity of strict compliance with rules and timelines. Sloppiness, whether in bankruptcy petitions (Tsoi Man), missing deadlines (Tritech), or ambush tactics (Carmon), is unacceptable and will be met with severe sanctions, including the dismissal of claims, indemnity costs orders or the imposition of conditions.
(2) High Threshold for Late Applications in the Post-CJR era: Carmon serves as a clear reminder that the threshold for late applications to amend or to introduce new evidence is particularly high in the post-CJR era. Practitioners must comply with the court’s timetable where trial dates are “milestone dates”.
[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=176647
[2] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=176627
[3] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=176699
[4] Re Tsoi Man (HCB 5570/2025, date of judgment: 26 January 2026), §21
[5] Ibid, §1
[6] Ibid, §6
[7] Ibid, §8
[8] Ibid, §9-§10
[9] Ibid, §11
[10] Re Tritech Distribution Ltd (HCCW 458/2025, date of judgment: 23 January 2026), §1
[11] Ibid, §10
[12] Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia e Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) Limitada v. Carmon Restrutura Ltd and another (HCA 1812/2022, date of judgment: 26 January 2026), §6
[13] Ibid, §5
[14] Re Tsoi Man (HCB 5570/2025, date of judgment: 26 January 2026), §16
[15] Ibid, §17
[16] Ibid, §21
[17] Re Tritech Distribution Ltd (HCCW 458/2025, date of judgment: 23 January 2026), §8
[18] Ibid, §9
[19] Ibid, §12
[20] Ibid, §13
[21] Ibid, §14
[22] Ibid, §16
[23] Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia e Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) Limitada v. Carmon Restrutura Ltd and another (HCA 1812/2022, date of judgment: 26 January 2026), §8
[24] Ibid, §12
[25] Ibid, §13
[26] Ibid, §14
[27] Ibid, §18
[28] Ibid, §23-§29
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