(A) Introduction
In Chan Chun Hei Ryan v. Hang Seng Bank Limited, DCMP 1602/2025, date of judgment: 22 January 2026, [1] the District Court addressed an important and fundamental question: whether, and under which provisions, the District Court has jurisdiction to grant relief under Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 (“Norwich Pharmacal” / “Norwich Pharmacal relief”).
At the outset, the Judge noted that, although District Court Judges have frequently granted such relief, there were only two District Court decisions in which the issue of jurisdiction was expressly examined, namely, (1) A v B [2019] HKDC 594 [2] and (2) Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Limited [2025] 5 HKC 819 (“Kwong Sin Yee Florence”) [3]. Most importantly, neither of those decisions was binding on the court. The Judge ultimately agreed with the learned Judges’ conclusion that the District Court does have jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief. Having said that, he departed from their reasoning and offered a new statutory foundation for that jurisdiction.
The landmark decision provides significant clarification on the jurisdictional framework governing the District Court’s power to grant disclosure orders against innocent third parties.
(B) Facts
In around August 2022, the Plaintiff and Lam Wei Chuen Joe (“Lam”) entered into an oral agreement, under which the Plaintiff agreed to grant Lam two supplementary cards from two American Express accounts (the “Cards”), on the condition that Lam would repay all expenditures incurred by him no later than the repayment date stated on the monthly charge card statements issued by American Express. [4]
Between November 2023 and January 2024, Lam incurred expenditures on the Cards and failed to make any repayment of those sums. [5]
In January 2025, Lam provided the Plaintiff with two post-dated cheques (the “Cheques”) drawn by one Chung Mei Ling (“Chung”) on an account held with the Defendant bank. [6] Both cheques were dishonoured. [7]
The Plaintiff intended to sue Chung in respect of the Cheques, but did not know her identity or address. [8] Therefore, by way of an Originating Summons, he made a Norwich Pharmacal application and sought an order that the Defendant do disclose to him or his legal representatives all bank statements and transaction information relating to Chung from 1 January 2025 onwards as well as Chung’s last known address. [9]
At the hearing on 5 November 2025, the Plaintiff confined his application to seeking only Chung’s last known address on the ground that such information was necessary for the Plaintiff to commence legal proceedings against her (the “Plaintiff’s Application”). [10]
(C) Decision
The District Court has jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal Relief
The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s reliance on three grounds to establish jurisdiction for granting Norwich Pharmacal relief: (i) inherent jurisdiction of the District Court; (ii) Section 47A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336) (“DCO”); and (iii) Order 24 rules 7A(1) and 11A of the Rules of District Court (Cap 336H) (“RDC”) as the bases upon which this Court may grant Norwich Pharmacal relief to him. [11]
Its reasoning was as follows:
(1) Inherent jurisdiction: Under Section 3(2) of the DCO, the District Court’s jurisdiction and powers are limited to those expressly conferred by the DCO or other enactments. Unlike the High Court, it does not possess inherent jurisdiction to hear any case. [12]
(2) Section 47A of the DCO: This provision was not applicable in the present case as the Defendant bank is an innocent third party and is unlikely to become a party to any subsequent proceedings. Further, the relief sought by the Plaintiff, namely, Chung’s last known address, was not a “document” within the meaning of Section 47A. [13]
(3) Order 24 rules 7A(1) and 11A of the RDC: These rules only prescribe the procedure for applications under Section 47A of the DCO. They don’t themselves confer jurisdiction. [14]
Further, the Judge referred to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal’s obiter observation in Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co of Canada v Harvest Hero International Ltd [2002] 1 HKLRD 828 that Norwich Pharmacal “was not about injunctive relief” and concluded that a Norwich Pharmacal order does not fall within the ambit of Section 52 of DCO. [15]
The Judge also declined to characterize Norwich Pharmacal applications as merely “procedural”. [16] Instead, it was held that an application for Norwich Pharmacal relief is a standalone action seeking substantive equitable relief. [17]
Moreover, the Judge disagreed with the reasoning in Kwong Sin Yee Florence, which held that there was no express provision for the District Court’s power to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief, but such power is derivable by statutory implication. [18] The Court held that such a power is not reasonably required for the effective exercise of the jurisdiction under Part 4 of the DCO. [19]
The Court added that Norwich Pharmacal relief is not confined to facilitating the commencement of civil claims. [20] Therefore, it would be difficult to justify the District Court’s jurisdiction to grant such relief on the basis that it is impliedly necessary to ensure that “potential claims” within its jurisdiction can be effectively commenced. The relief is neither confined to enabling proceedings to be brought in the District Court and its scope is materially wider. [21]
The Correct Jurisdictional Route
The Court identified a direct route to establishing jurisdiction: a combined reading of Part 4 and section 48 of the DCO. [22]
Part 4 of the DCO sets out the District Court’s civil jurisdiction. In summary: [23]
(1) Section 32(1) confers jurisdiction to hear and determine any action founded on contract, quasi-contract or tort where the claim does not exceed HK$3,000,000;
(2) Section 33(1) confers jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for the recovery of money (not exceeding HK$3,000,000) by virtue of any enactment in force;
(3) Section 35 confers jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for the recovery of land where the annual rent, or the rateable value, or the annual value, whichever is the least, does not exceed HK$320,000;
(4) Section 36 confers jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in which the title to an interest in land comes into question, subject to the same limit; and
(5) Section 37(1) sets out the District Court’s equity jurisdiction in matters such as administration of estates, execution of trusts, foreclosure or redemption of mortgages, proceedings for specific performance, rectification, or rescission of an agreement for the sale, purchase or lease of property, matters relating to infants, winding-up of partnerships, and relief against fraud or mistake, subject to the value limit under section 37(2).
As for its ancillary jurisdiction, Section 48(1)(a) provides that the District Court has the same power as the Court of First Instance to grant “the relief, redress, or remedy or combination of remedies… which ought to be granted or given”. Section 48(2) further provides that the District Court has to administer law and equity, and in cases of conflict the rules of equity shall prevail. [24]
The Court explained that in every application for Norwich Pharmacal relief, the plaintiff must identify an underlying cause of action or complaint against a wrongdoer. If the underlying claim falls within one of the jurisdiction-conferring provisions in Part 4, then the District Court may invoke its ancillary jurisdiction under Section 48 to grant equitable relief in the form of a Norwich Pharmacal order. [25]
Conditions for Granting Norwich Pharmacal Relief
The Court reaffirmed the conditions for granting Norwich Pharmacal relief, namely that it must be satisfied: [26]
(1) There is cogent and compelling evidence to demonstrate that serious tortious or wrongful activities have taken place;
(2) The order will very likely reap substantial and worthwhile benefits for the plaintiff; and
(3) The discovery sought must not be unduly wide.
The Plaintiff’s Application
The Court allowed the Plaintiff’s Application on the ground that all the requisite conditions were met:
(1) The Plaintiff’s underlying claim against Chung was founded on contract (dishonoured cheques) and fell within the scope of Section 32(1) of the DCO. [27]
(2) The Court accepted that the dishonour of the Cheques constituted serious wrongful conduct. [28]
(3) The Plaintiff had no means of contacting Chung. As such, disclosure of Chung’s last known address was necessary to commence legal proceedings against her. [29]
(4) The discovery sought was limited to Chung’s last known address and was not unduly wide. [30]
(D) Key Takeaways
Norwich Pharmacal relief is a useful tool for victims of wrongdoing to identify potential defendant(s) to an action and/or to obtain information necessary to plead a claim. This decision is of major practical significance for parties seeking such relief in the District Court on the following grounds:
(1) Clarifications on Jurisdictional Route: The Court held that the District Court has no inherent jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief and Section 47A of the DCO is inapplicable to applications against innocent third parties. Instead, jurisdiction arises from a combined reading of Part 4 and Section 48 of the DCO. If the underlying claim falls within the District Court’s civil jurisdiction, the Norwich Pharmacal application is treated as an “action” falling under the corresponding jurisdictional provision. The Court may then grant relief as ancillary equitable relief under Section 48 of the DCO.
(2) Norwich Pharmacal as Substantive Equitable Relief: The Court clarified that a Norwich Pharmacal application is not merely procedural or injunctive. It is a standalone substantive equitable remedy.
(3) Practical Guidance for Applicants: Applicants should (i) clearly identify the underlying cause of action and ensure that it falls within the District Court’s jurisdictional limits under Part 4 of the DCO; (ii) frame the relief sought narrowly and precisely, for example, by seeking only the identity or contact details of the alleged wrongdoer; and (iii) demonstrate that such disclosure is necessary to enable the commencement of the proceedings.
[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=176581
[2] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=121704
[3] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=171002
[4] Chan Chun Hei Ryan v. Hang Seng Bank Limited, DCMP 1602/2025, date of judgment: 22 January 2026, §6
[5] Ibid, §8
[6] Ibid, §11-§12
[7] Ibid, §13-§14
[8] Ibid, §15
[9] Ibid, §16
[10] Ibid, §17
[11] Ibid, §20
[12] Ibid, §21
[13] Ibid, §23
[14] Ibid, §24
[15] Ibid, §37
[16] Ibid, §46
[17] Ibid, §47
[18] Ibid, §51
[19] Ibid, §52
[20] Ibid, §53
[21] Ibid, §54
[22] Ibid, §55
[23] Ibid, §56
[24] Ibid, §57
[25] Ibid, §58
[26] Ibid, §71
[27] Ibid, §70
[28] Ibid, §72
[29] Ibid, §73
[30] Ibid, §74
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